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THE  QUANTITY  THEORY  OF  MONEY: 
ITS HISTORICAL  EVOLUTION  AND  ROLE  IN POLICY  DEBATES 
One  of  the  oldest  surviving  economic  doctrines  is 
the  quantity  theory  of  money,  which  in  its  simplest 
and  crudest  form  states  that  changes  in  the  general 
level  of  commodity  prices  are  determined  primarily 
by  changes  in  the  quantity  of  money  in  circulation. 
This  theory  dates  back  at  least  to  the  mid-16th  cen- 
tury  when  the  French  social  philosopher  Jean  Bodin 
first  attributed  the  price  inflation  then  raging  in 
Western  Europe  to  the  abundance  of monetary  metals 
imported  from  the  mines  of  the  Spanish  colonies  in 
South  America.  After  undergoing  considerable  re- 
finement,  elaboration,  amendment,  and  extension  in 
the  late  17th  and  18th  centuries  by  John  Locke, 
Richard  Cantillon,  and  David  Hume,  the  quantity 
theory  was  integrated  into  the  mainstream  of  ortho- 
dox  monetary  tradition.  Forming  the  central  core 
of  19th  century  classical  monetary  analysis,  the  quan- 
tity  theory  provided  both  the  dominant  conceptual 
framework  for  the  interpretation  of  financial  events 
in  that  century  and  the  chief  intellectual  foundations 
of  orthodox  policy  prescriptions  designed  to  preserve 
the  gold  standard.  Today  the  quantity  theory  sur- 
vives  and  flourishes  in  the  doctrines  of  the  so-called 
monetarist  school  emanating  from  such  institutions 
as the  University  of  Chicago  and  the  Federal  Reserve 
Bank  of  St.  Louis.  Spearheaded  by  economists 
Milton  Friedman,  Karl  Brunner,  Allen  Meltzer, 
Philip  Cagan,  and  others,  contemporary  monetarists 
continue  to  expound  quantity  theory  propositions 
similar  to  those  enunciated  by  their  classical  prede- 
cessors. 
The  quantity  theory  has  not  gone  unchallenged, 
however.  As  controversial  as  it  is ancient,  the  quan- 
tity  theory  has  probably  stimulated  more  debate  than 
any  other  single  topic  in the  field  of monetary  theory. 
Some  of  the  leading  monetary  controversies  of  the 
past  two  centuries,  including  the  Bullionist  and  Cur- 
rency  School-Banking  School  debates  of  the  1800’s, 
and  the  controversy  between  Keynes  and  the  neo- 
classical  economists  in  the  1930’s,  have  revolved 
around  issues  relating  to  the  quantity  theory.  More- 
over,  the  debate  shows  little  sign  of  subsiding.  Many 
of  the  same  quantity  theory-related  issues  appearing 
in  the  earlier  debates  figure  prominently  in  the  cur- 
rent  controversy  between  the  monetarist  and  post- 
Keynesian  schools  of  thought. 
The  purpose  of  this  article  is  to  introduce  Eco- 
NOMIC REVIEW  readers  to  this much-debated  theory 
and  to  the  major  monetary  controversies  surrounding 
it.  Accordingly,  the  article  (1)  examines  the  content 
and  implications  of the  key  propositions  of the  theory, 
(2)  traces  the  evolution  of  these  propositions  from 
their  17th  and  18th  century  origins  to  their  present 
embodiment  in  monetarist  doctrine,  (3)  sketches  the 
role  played  by  the  quantity  theory  in  the  Bullionist, 
Currency-Banking  School,  and  Keynesian  policy  de- 
bates,  and  (4)  outlines  the  major  criticisms  leveled 
against  the  theory  during  the  past  two  centuries. 
WHAT  IS  QUANTITY  THEORY? 
the  quantity  is  a 
about  the  cause  of  in  the  or 
purchasing  of money.  to the 
changes  in  value  of  are  determined 
by  changes  the  quantity  circulation.  When 
becomes  abundant,  value  or 
power  falls,  consequently  the  of  com- 
prices  rises.  if  money 
scarce,  its  power  rises  general  prices 
In  short,  quantity  theory  that  the 
of  money  is  the  determinant  of 
price  level 
This  brief  of  the  however,  does 
do  it  justice.  More  just  the  con- 
clusion  money  governs  the  theory 
consists  of  set  of  propositions  or 
lates  that  that  conclusion.  most  im- 
of  these  refer  to  the  propor- 
of  M  P,  (2)  active  or  role  of 
in  the  transmission  mechanism,  the 
neutrality  money,  (4)  monetary  theory  the 
price  and  (5)  exogeneity  of  nominal 
stock  money. 
The  Proportionality  Postulate  The  first  propo- 
sition  states  that  P  will  vary  in  exact  proportion  to 
changes  in  the  quantity  of  M,  i.e.,  a given  percentage 
change  in  the  stock  of  money  will  result  in an  identi- 
cal  percentage  change  in  commodity  prices.  Asso- 
ciated  with  the  strict  classical  version  of  the  quantity 
theory,  this  proposition  follows  from  the  assumption 
that  people  want  to  hold  for  transactions  purposes  a 
constant  quantity  of  real  (price-deflated)  cash  bal- 
ances,  M/P,  at  the  economy’s  full-capacity  level  of 
real  output.  Because  these  cashholders  look  to  the 
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value  of  their  cash  balances,  the  price  level  must 
vary  in  direct  proportion  to  the  nominal  money 
supply  to  maintain  real  balances  intact. 
It  should  be  noted  that  the  proportionality  postu- 
late  implies  that  the  demand  for  real  cash  balances 
and  its  counterpart,  the  circulation  velocity  of money, 
are  completely  stable.  For  if velocity  or  the  demand 
for  money  were  unstable,  i.e.,  subject  to  erratic  and 
unpredictable  shifts,  one  could  not  safely  predict  that 
M  and  P  would  change  in  the  same  ratio.  Suppose, 
for  example,  that  a  doubling  of  the  nominal  money 
supply,  M,  is  accompanied  by  (1)  a  halving  or  (2) 
a  doubling  of the  desire  for  real  balances.  The  price 
level  would  have  to  quadruple  in  the  first  case  and 
remain  unchanged  in  the  second  if  real  balances, 
M/P,  were  to  attain  their  desired  levels.  In  fact, 
any  arbitrary  shift  in  the  amount  of  real  balances 
demanded  would  necessitate  a percentage  change  in  P 
different  from  that  of M.  Only  if the  demand  for  real 
balances  remains  unchanged  will  the  proportionality 
relationship  hold.  It  follows,  therefore,  that  the  strict 
version  of  the  quantity  theory  must  assume  complete 
stability  of  the  demand  for  money  if  it  is  to  predict 
that  money  and  prices  will  show  equiproportionate 
variations. 
Causal  Role  of  Money  A  second  key  proposition 
of  the  quantity  theory  states  that  the  direction  of 
causation  or  channel  of  influence  runs  from  M  to  P, 
i.e.,  monetary  changes  precede  and  cause  price  level 
changes.  In  this  cause-and-effect  relationship,  money 
is seen  as the  active  variable  and  the  price  level  as the 
passive  or  dependent  variable. 
One  important  implication  stemming  from  the  in- 
terpretation  of  money  as  the  active  variable  is  that 
the  proportionality  between  money  and  prices  refers 
to  an  equilibrium  condition  established  via  a dynamic 
adjustment  process,  and  not  to  an  identity  that  holds 
at  all  points  in  time.  The  lead-lag,  cause-effect  rela- 
tionship  between  money  and  prices  implies  that  a 
change  in  M initially  creates  a disequilibrium  between 
M  and  P.  This  disequilibrium  then  invokes  forces 
that  cause  P  to  change.  Prices  continue  to  change 
until  proportionality  is  restored  and  the  disequilib- 
rium  is  eliminated. 
For  such  an  adjustment  process  to  occur,  however, 
there  must  be  some  mechanism,  channel,  or  linkage 
through  which  monetary  impulses  are  transmitted 
to  the  price  level.  Traditionally,  two  main  transmis- 
sion  mechanisms  have  been  identified,  namely,  the (1) 
direct  expenditure  and  (2)  indirect  interest  rate 
mechanisms.  The  direct  mechanism  refers  to  the  pro- 
cess  by  which  the  impact  of  a  monetary  change  is 
channeled  to  the  price  level  via  a  prior  effect  on  the 
demand  for  goods.  The  key  link  in  this  process  is 
the  relationship  between  the  rate  of  spending  on  the 
one  hand  and  the  discrepancy  between  actual  and 
desired  real  balances  on  the  other.  Variations  in  the 
rate  of  spending  are  seen  as  the  means  by  which 
actual  real  cash  balances  are  adjusted  to  the  level 
that  people  desire  to  hold.  Thus,  for  example,  start- 
ing  from  a  position  of  monetary  equilibrium,  an  in- 
crease  in  the  money  supply  initially  will  raise  real 
cash  balances  above  the  preexisting  desired  level. 
Cashholders  will  be  left  with  more  money  than  they 
want  to  hold,  thereby  prompting  them  to  get  rid  of 
the  excess  via  spending  for  goods.  Given  that  the 
economy  is  operating  at  full  capacity,  however,  the 
increased  spending  will  exert  upward  pressure  on 
prices.  Spending,  prices,  and  nominal  income  will 
continue  to  rise  until  cashholders  are  just  satisfied  to 
hold  the  nominal  money  in existence.  Equilibrium  is 
restored  when  P  has  risen  sufficiently  to  bring  real 
cash  balances  back  to  the  desired  level.  In  brief,  the 
direct  mechanism  relies  on  the  disequilibrium  be- 
tween  actual  and  desired  real  balances  to  induce  the 
spending  that  ultimately  causes  prices  to  change  in 
proportion  to  the  monetary  injection.  The  sequence 
runs  directly  from  money  to  spending  to  prices. 
By  contrast,  the  indirect  mechanism  refers  to  the 
process  by which  a monetary  change  influences  spend- 
ing  and  prices  indirectly  via  its  prior  effect  on  the 
interest  rate.  In  this  process,  a  monetary  injection 
first  causes  the  rate  of  interest  to  fall,  thereby  stimu- 
lating  business  investment  spending  and  thus  exerting 
upward  pressure  on  prices.  More  precisely,  the  indi- 
rect  mechanism  relies  on  two  links:  (1)  the  creation 
of a  monetary-induced  gap  between  the  expected  rate 
of profit  on capital  investment  and  the  market  rate  of 
interest  and  (2)  an  investment  response  to  this  gap. 
The  direct  and  indirect  mechanisms  provide  the  two 
main  channels  through  which  the  dynamic  price  ad- 
justment  process  works.1 
The  Neutrality  Postulate  A  third  proposition 
states  that,  except  for  transitional  adjustment  periods, 
monetary  changes  exert  no  influence  on real  economic 
variables,  e.g.,  total  output,  employment,  and  the 
product-mix.  These  variables,  it  is argued,  are  deter- 
mined  by  basic  non-monetary  conditions  such  as 
tastes,  technology,  resource  endowments,  and  rates 
of technical  substitution  between  factor  resources.  As 
the  quantity  of  money  in  no  way  alters  these  funda- 
mental  conditions,  it  follows  that  monetary  changes 
1Two  points  of  clarification  should  be  made  here.  First,  one  does 
not  necessarily  have  to  be  a  quantity  theorist  to  accept  the  validity 
of  the  monetary  transmission  mechanisms.  In  fact,  the  indirect 
mechanism  today  is  frequently  associated  with  non-quantity  ap- 
proaches  to  monetary  theory.  Second,  modern  Quantity  theorists 
sometimes  argue  for  the  direct  money-spending  mechanism  merely 
as  an  empirical  proxy  for  a  complicated  portfolio  adjustment  p-s 
in  which  specific  interest  rate  effects  cannot  be captured  statistically. 
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In  brief,  money  is  thought  to  be  merely  a  veil,  ob- 
scuring  but  not  affecting  the  operation  of  real  eco- 
nomic  forces. 
Note,  however,  that  the  neutrality  postulate,  like 
the  proportionality  postulate,  refers  only  to  long-run 
equilibrium.  During  the  short-run  transition  to 
equilibrium,  monetary  changes  very  definitely  can 
have  non-neutral  effects  on  real  variables.  For  ex- 
ample,  during  the  transition  period  there  may  be 
wealth-distribution  effects  stemming  from  the  failure 
of  some  cashholders  to  get  their  pro  rata  share  of 
additional  money  and  from  the  impact  of  unantici- 
pated  price-level  changes  on  the  real  value  of  fixed- 
dollar  financial  claims.  These  distribution  effects 
will  alter  the  composition  of  demand  and  thus  the 
structure  of  production.  Moreover,  some  commodity 
and  factor  prices  may  adjust  more  swiftly  than  others 
thereby  altering  relative  prices  (market  exchange 
ratios)  and  thus  relative  quantities  of  real  variables. 
The  quantity  theory  does  not  deny  that  money 
changes  may  influence  resource  allocation  in  the 
transition  period.  What  it  does  claim,  however,  is 
that  these  non-neutral  effects  are  temporary  and  that 
they  will  vanish  in  long-run  equilibrium  when  the 
economy  has  adjusted  fully  to  the  monetary  change. 
Monetary  Theory  of  the  Price  Level  The neu- 
trality  postulate  states  that  changes  in  the  quantity  of 
money  affect  only  the  price  level.  As  stated,  how- 
ever,  this  proposition  is not  sufficient  to  rule  out  the 
possibility  that  non-monetary  variables  may  also  be 
important  determinants  of P.  An  additional  condition 
must  be  invoked.  Accordingly,  a  fourth  postulate 
states  that  the  price  level  itself  tends  to  be  influenced 
predominantly  by  changes  in  the  quantity  of  money. 
The  implication  is  that  price  level  instability  stems 
principally  from  monetary  rather  than  non-monetary 
disturbances.  Thus,  inflation  and  deflation  are  largely 
attributed  to  the  erratic  behavior  of  the  money  stock 
rather  than  to  non-monetary  causes  originating  in the 
real  (commodity)  sector  of  the  economy. 
It  should  be  noted  that  the  fourth  postulate  refers 
to  the  general  price  level  and  not  to  relative  prices, 
i.e.,  relationships  among  the  prices  of  individual  com- 
modities  (market  exchange  ratios).  Quantity  the- 
orists  readily  admit  that  non-monetary  influences- 
e.g.,  technological  progress  and  productivity  change  ; 
crop  failures,  embargoes,  and  other  disruptions  in the 
supplies  of food  and  raw  materials  ; monopoly  power  ; 
excise  taxes  and  the  like-can  directly  affect  relative 
prices.  But  they  argue  that  such  non-monetary- 
induced  changes  in  the  prices  of  some  commodities 
are  often  likely  to  be balanced  by  opposite  changes  in 
the  prices  of  others,  leaving  the  average  price  level 
unchanged.  They  hold  that  it  is  usually  monetary 
shocks,  not  real-sector  disturbances,  that  exert  the 
dominant  effect  on  the  general  level  of prices. 
Exogeneity  of  the  Nominal  Stock  of  Money  A 
fifth  condition  required  by  the  quantity  theory  is that 
the  nominal  stock  of  money  be  non-demand  deter- 
mined.  This  requirement  is a corollary  of  the  propo- 
sition  that  nominal  M is the  independent  causal  factor 
governing  P.  For  if the  quantity  of  money  is not  an 
independent  variable,  but  instead  responds  passively 
to  prior  shifts  in  the  demand  for  it,  then  quantity 
theorists  could  not  claim  that  it  played  the  active 
initiating  role  in  the  determination  of  the  price  level. 
It  should  be  emphasized  that  the  exogenity  postu- 
late  refers  to  the  nominal  rather  than  the  real  stock 
of  money.  The  distinction  between  the  two  stocks  is 
crucial.  Unlike  the  nominal  stock,  the  real  stock  is 
treated  by  the  quantity  theory  as an  endogenous  vari- 
able  determined  by  the  public’s  demand  for  real  bal- 
ances.  As  previously  discussed,  the  public,  via  the 
impact  of  its  spending  on  the  price  level,  can  make 
the  real  value  (purchasing  power)  of  any  given 
nominal  stock  of  money  equal  to  the  desired  quantity 
of  real  cash  balances.  In  brief,  the  real  money  stock 
is  seen  as  a  dependent  variable  determined  by  the 
public’s  decisions  to  acquire  or  get  rid  of cash. 
Such  is not  the  interpretation  given  to the  nominal 
stock,  however.  Quantity  theorists  long  have  argued 
that,  in  fact,  the  nominal  stock  of  money  is  largely 
determined  by  factors  independent  of  those  deter- 
mining  the  demand  for  it.  Traditionally,  the  quantity 
theory  has  treated  the  nominal  money  stock  as  a 
largely  exogenous  variable.  In  the  days  of  the  gold 
specie  standard,  a nation’s  money  stock  was  regarded 
as  mainly  predetermined  by  the  past  and  current 
production  of  gold  and  by  the  state  of  the  external 
accounts  (balance  of  payments).  Later,  when  paper 
money  had  replaced  gold,  the  stock  of  money  was 
regarded  as  exogenously  determined  by  the  inde- 
pendent  central  bank  via  its  control  over  a narrowly- 
defined  base  of  so-called  high-powered  money  con- 
sisting  chiefly  of  the  central  bank’s  own  liabilities. 
This  interpretation  of  the  central  bank  as  the  exo- 
genous  controller  of  the  money  stock,  it  should  be 
pointed  out,  assumes  the  existence  of  stable  links 
between  the  base  of  high-powered  money  created  by 
the  central  bank,  and  the  deposit  and  banknote  money 
generated  by  the  commercial  banking  system.  These 
stable  links  are  necessary  if the  total  money  supply  is 
to  behave  exactly  as its  exogenously  determined  com- 
ponent,  the  monetary  base.  Generally,  quantity  the- 
orists  have  argued  that  these  stable  links  exist. 
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of  stable  linkages  to  minimize  the  problems  that 
money  substitutes  may  pose  for  monetary  regulation 
and  control.  The  quantity  theory  has  never  denied 
that  near-moneys  may  influence  spending  and  prices 
just  as  money  does.  What  the  theory  has  denied, 
however,  is that  the  volume  of money  substitutes  can 
expand  or  contract  independently  of  the  volume  of 
money  and  thus  act as an autonomous  influence  on the 
price  level.  Instead,  money  and  money  substitutes 
are  thought  to  be  related  via  a  stable  link  so  that 
variations  in  the  former  will  be  accompanied  by 
roughly  proportional  variations  in  the  latter. 
DEVELOPMENT  OF  THE  QUANTITY  THEORY 
UP  TO  THE  NINETEENTH  CENTURY 
The  main  outlines  of  the  quantity  theory  began  to 
take  shape  as  early  as  the  mid-16th  century  when 
Jean  Bodin  first  stated  his  monetary  theory  of  the 
price  inflation  then  occurring  in  Western  Europe. 
Later  writers  lent  precision  to  Bodin’s  hypothesis  by 
postulating  that  the  value  or  purchasing  power  of 
money  varies  in  exact  proportion  to  the  quantity  in 
circulation  so that  a doubling  of  M will  double  P  and 
halve  the  value  of  the  monetary  unit.  At  first  the 
proportionality  postulate  was  treated  as  an  identity. 
As  originally  stated  by  John  Locke  in  1691,  the 
postulate  asserted  that  P  is always  proportional  to  M. 
In  1752  David  Hume  introduced  the  notion  of  caus- 
ation  by  stating  that  variations  in  M  will  cause 
proportionate  changes  in  P.  By  the  time  it  reached 
the  Classical  economists  in  the  early  19th  century, 
the  proportionality  postulate  was  understood  as  a 
proposition  of  comparative  static  analysis,  valid  only 
for  the  comparison  of  states  of old and  new  monetary 
equilibrium  after  the  economic  system  had  fully  ad- 
justed  to  a  change  in  the  money  stock.  It  was  recog- 
nized  that  proportionality  between  M  and  P  tem- 
porarily  would  be  disturbed  during  the  transition 
period  between  successive  monetary  equilibria. 
Richard  Cantillon  and  David  Hume,  both  writing 
in  the  18th  century,  were  the  first  to  apply  to  the 
quantity  theory  the  two  crucial  distinctions  :  (1)  be- 
tween  economic  statics  and  dynamics,  i.e.,  between 
long-run  stationary  equilibrium  and  short-run  move- 
ments  toward  equilibrium,  and  (2)  between  the  long- 
run  neutrality  and  the  short-run  non-neutrality  of 
money.  In  what  were  perhaps  the  earliest  examples 
of  dynamic  process  analysis,  these  writers  described 
the  sequence  of  steps  by  which  the  impact  of  a mone- 
tary  change  spreads  from  one  sector  of  the  economy 
to  another,  altering  relative  prices  and  quantities  in 
the  process.  Cantillon  and  Hume  pointed  out  that 
adjustment  would  continue  until  all  prices  had 
changed  in  equal  proportion  to  the  money  stock  and 
all quantities  had  returned  to  their  pre-existing  levels. 
Especially  vivid  was  the  Cantillon-Hume  account  of 
the  short-run  non-neutrality  of  money.  Cantillon 
pointed  out  that  the  dynamic  adjustment  path  would 
be influenced  by the  way  new  money  was  injected  into 
the  system.  Specifically,  he  stated  that  most  mone- 
tary  injections  would  involve  non-neutral  distribu- 
tion  effects.  He  argued  that,  generally,  new  money 
will  not  be  distributed  among  individuals  in  propor- 
tion  to  their  pre-existing  share  of  money  holdings. 
Some  will  receive  more,  and  others  less,  than  their 
proportionate  share.  The  former  group  will  benefit 
at  the  expense  of  the  latter  and  therefore,  via  their 
money  outlays,  will  play  a greater  role  in determining 
the  composition  of output.  In  short,  Cantillon  demon- 
strated  how  initial  distribution  effects  temporarily 
could  alter  the  pattern  of  expenditures  and  thus  the 
structure  of  production  and  the  allocation  of  re- 
sources. 
David  Hume  described  how  different  degrees  of 
money  illusion  among  income  recipients,  coupled  with 
time  delays  in  the  adjustment  process,  could  cause 
costs  to  lag  behind  prices,  thus  creating  profits  and 
stimulating  the  formation  of  optimistic  profit  expec- 
tations.  Hume  believed  that  both  actual  profits  and 
optimistic  expectations  would  spur  business  expan- 
sion  and  employment  during  the  transition  period. 
These  non-neutral  effects  were  expected  to  vanish  in 
the  long-run,  however. 
To  the  Cantillon-Hume  list  of  temporary  non- 
neutral  effects,  19th  century  economists  added  others, 
most  of  which  stemmed  from  the  fixity  of  certain 
types  of contractual  payments  and  from  the  failure  of 
all  factor-resource  prices  to  adjust  with  equal  swift- 
ness.  These  additional  non-neutral  effects  included  : 
(1)  the  lag  of  money  wages  behind  prices  which 
temporarily  reduces  real  wages,  thereby  encouraging 
increased  demand  for  labor  ;  (2)  the  stimulus  to 
output  occasioned  by  inflation-induced  reductions  in 
real  debt  burdens  which  shift  real  income  from  un- 
productive  creditor-rentiers  to  productive  debtor- 
entrepreneurs  ;  (3)  so-called  “forced-saving”  effects, 
i.e.,  changes  in  the  fraction  of  the  economy’s  re- 
sources  diverted  from  consumption  into  capital  for- 
mation  owing  to  price-induced  redistributions  of  in- 
come  among  socio-economic  classes  having  different 
propensities  to  save  and  invest  ; and  (4)  the  stimulus 
to  investment  spending  imparted  by  a  temporary  re- 
duction  in  the  loan  rate  of  interest  below  the  profit 
rate  on  real  capital. 
While  acknowledging  the  existence  of  these  non- 
neutral  effects,  however,  classical  quantity  theorists 
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de-emphasis  of transition  effects  is what  distinguished 
the  classical  version  of  the  quantity  theory  from  the 
earlier  Cantillon-Hume  version.  Whereas  the  latter 
tended  to  stress  dynamic  disequilibrium  periods  in 
which  money  matters  much,  classical  analysts  focused 
on  long-run  equilibrium  in  which  money  is  just  a 
veil.  Whereas  Cantillon  and  Hume  thought  that 
transition  periods  would  be  protracted,  classical 
analysts  saw  them  as  evanescent.  Whereas  the  Can- 
tillon-Hume  analysis  stressed  the  output  and  em- 
ployment  effects  of  inflation,  classical  analysis  virtu- 
ally  ignored,  or  treated  as  insignificant,  those  real 
effects.  The  prevailing  view,  the  position  of  the  most 
influential  of the  classical  economists,  especially  David 
Ricardo,  was  that  these  disequilibrium  effects  were 
ephemeral  and  unimportant,  mere  qualifications  to 
the  long-run  equilibrium  analysis.  This  opinion  may 
have  been  conditioned  by  Ricardo’s  penchant  for 
abstract,  comparative-static  theorizing.  Or  perhaps 
it  sprang  from  his  desire  for  an  uncomplicated  and 
convincing  theory  to  support  his  charge  that  inflation 
in  Britain  was  solely  the  result  of  the  Bank  of  Eng- 
land’s  irresponsible  overissue  of  currency.  Such  a 
theory  would  be  more  effective  if  it  isolated  price- 
level  effects  and  abstracted  from  real  effects.  Most 
likely,  Ricardo  and  other  classical  economists  avoided 
discussions  of  any  beneficial  output  and  employment 
effects  of  monetary  injections  in  fear  of  providing 
crude  inflationists  with  arguments  to  support  their 
case.  Whatever  the  reason,  non-neutral  transition 
effects  were  slighted. 
Finally,  an  advance  in  understanding  of  the  mone- 
tary  transmission  mechanism  occurred.  This  prog- 
ress  accompanied  the  historical  evolution  from  a  pre- 
dominantly  full-bodied  money  to  a  mixed  metal- 
paper  money  that  occurred  in  the  18th  century. 
Written  in  the  era  of  full-bodied  money,  the  Cantil- 
lon-Hume  account  of  the  adjustment  process  had 
relied  solely  on  the  direct  mechanism  to  raise  prices. 
In  the  Cantillon-Hume  analysis,  an  arbitrary  influx 
of gold  coin  induces  an  increase  in  the  rate  of  spend- 
ing  until  all  incomes  and  prices  had  risen  in  propor- 
tion  to  the  monetary  injection.  The  direct  mechan- 
ism,  however,  no  longer  sufficed  as  an  explanation  of 
the  adjustment  process  after  gold  coin  had  given  way 
to  bank  notes  in  the  19th  century.  The  main  short- 
coming  of  the  direct  mechanism  was  that  it  failed  to 
explain  how  bank  notes  and  other  forms  of  paper 
money  are  injected  into  the  system.  In  his  1802 
classic,  The  Paper  Credit  of  Great  Britain,  Henry 
Thornton  provided  the  first  exposition  of  the  indirect 
mechanism.  Pointing  out  that  new  money  created  by 
banks  enters  the  financial  markets  initially  via  an 
expansion  of  bank  loans,  Thornton  described  how 
the  increased  supply  of  loanable  funds  temporarily 
reduces  the  loan  rate  of  interest  below  the  profit  rate 
(expected  yield)  on  new  capital  projects.  This  dis- 
parity  between  profit  and  loan  rates  stimulates  addi- 
tional  investment  spending,  thereby  exerting  upward 
pressure  on  product  prices,  including  the  price  of 
investment  goods.  With  investment  goods  becoming 
increasingly  expensive,  however,  businessmen  require 
more  and  more  loans  to  finance  their  purchases.  The 
demand  for  loans  therefore  increases,  bidding  up  the 
loan  rate  of  interest  in  the  process.  Equilibrium  is 
reestablished  when  rising  loan  demand  eventualIy 
overtakes  the  initially  expanded  supply  and  the 
money  rate  of  interest  rises  back  into  equality  with 
the  profit  rate.  Nineteenth  century  quantity  theorists 
incorporated  both  the  Cantillon-Hume  direct  mech- 
anism  and  the  Thornton  indirect  mechanism  in  their 
explanation  of  the  linkages  between  M  and  P. 
ROLE OF  THE QUANTITY  THEORY  IN 
CLASSICAL  POLICY  DEBATES 
The  first  half  of  the  19th  century,  an  era  in  which 
the  doctrines  of the  British  classical  school  dominated 
economic  thought,  saw  the  emergence  of  a  concen- 
trated  and  systematic  application  of  the  quantity 
theory  to  policy  problems.  Having  been  quickly 
absorbed  into  the  mainstream  of  classical  analysis, 
the  quantity  theory  became  the  standard  conceptual 
framework  for  the  analysis  of  monetary  problems 
and  for  the  formulation  of practical  policy  recommen- 
dations.  The  central  monetary  problems  in  England 
at  that  time  related  to  the  maintenance  of  external 
equilibrium  and  the  restoration  and  preservation  of 
the  gold  standard.  Consequently,  the  quantity  theory 
tended  to  be  directed  toward  the  analysis  of  inter- 
national  price  levels,  gold  drains,  exchange  rate  fluc- 
tuations,  trade  balance  deficits,  and  related  problems. 
The  Quantity  Theory  and  the  Price-Specie-Flow 
Mechanism  It  was  only  natural  that  the  quantity 
theory  was  applied  to  these  problems  of  inter- 
national  finance.  After  all,  the  theory  had  long 
played  a  strategic  role  in  the  classical  theory  of 
international  trade.  The  quantity  theory  was  the 
key  ingredient  in  the  classical  explanation  of  the 
operation  of  the  price-specie-flow  mechanism,  i.e., 
the  automatic  self-regulating  adjustment  mechan- 
ism  that  insures  the  restoration  and  preservation 
of  balance  of  payments  equilibrium  and  that  gov- 
erns  the  international  distribution  of  the  precious 
metals.  One  of  the  earliest  rigorous  explanations 
of  the  specie-flow  mechanism  was  provided  by 
David  Hume.  In  one  of  the  more  celebrated  pas- 
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started  out  by  assuming  a  five-fold  overnight  in- 
crease  in  the  domestic  money  supply.  Proceeding 
to  trace  the  consequences,  he  argued  that  wages 
and  prices  would  rise  in  proportion  to  the  mone- 
tary  change,  thereby  making  British  goods  more 
expensive  than  foreign  goods,  and  thus  causing 
imports  to  rise,  exports  to  fall,  and  gold  to  flow 
out.  The  external  gold  drain,  in  turn,  would  tend  to 
moderate  prices  in  Britain  and  raise  them  else- 
where.  Hume  held  that  the  trade-balance  deficit 
and  the  specie  outflow  would  continue  until  the 
purchasing  power  of  gold  was  the  same  every- 
where,  imports  and  exports  were  in  balance,  and 
the  terms  of  trade  were  identical  to  those  that 
would  reign  under  a  purely  barter  regime. 
It  is  readily  apparent  that  Hume’s  explanation 
embodies  most  of  the  key  elements  of  the  quan- 
tity  theory.  The  proportionality  postulate  is 
stated  explicitly.  The  most  prominent  element, 
however,  is  the  interpretation  of  money  as  the 
active  causal  variable-disturbing  initial  equili- 
brium,  driving  up  prices,  generating  a  trade  im- 
balance,  forcing  an  efflux  of  specie,  and  eventu- 
ally  restoring  equilibrium.  The  short-run  non- 
neutrality  of  money  emerges  in  the  form  of  the 
alteration  of  the  terms  of  trade  or  relative  prices 
of  exports  and  imports.  And  the  long-run  neu- 
trality  of  money  is  manifested  in  the  restoration 
of  the  pre-existing  barter  ratios.  These  same 
quantity  theory  elements  comprised  the  analyti- 
cal  framework  within  which  classical  economists 
discussed  the  events  and  policy  issues  surround- 
ing  the  leading  monetary  controversies  of  the  day. 
The  Bullionist  Controversy  The  two  great  mone- 
tary  debates  of the  classical  era  were  (1)  the  Bullion- 
ist controversy  that  took  place  in the  first  two  decades 
of  the  19th  century  during  and  immediately  after  the 
Napoleonic  Wars  and  (2)  the  Currency  School- 
Banking  School  controversy  during  the  middle  de- 
cades  of the  century.  The  Bullionist  controversy  was 
provoked  by  events  following  a  major  policy  shift  in 
1797.  In  that  year,  under  the  stress  of  the  Napole- 
onic  Wars,  Britain  left  the  gold  standard  for  an  in- 
convertible  paper  standard.  A  series  of  gold  drains, 
coinciding  with  heavy  military  outlays  abroad,  ex- 
travagant  government  borrowing,  and  extraordinary 
wheat  imports,  had  virtually  exhausted  the  Bank  of 
England’s  gold  holdings.  The  depletion  of the  Bank’s 
gold  reserve  thus  forced  the  suspension  of  specie 
payments.  The  Bank  was  released  from  its  obligation 
to  exchange  gold  for  currency  at  the  fixed  mint  price, 
i.e.,  bank  notes  were  no  longer  automatically  convert- 
ible into  gold.  The  suspension  of specie  payments  was 
followed  by  a  rise  in  the  price  of  bullion,  foreign  ex- 
change,  and  commodities  in  terms  of  paper  currency. 
A  debate  then  arose  centering  on  the  following 
issues:  Was  the  pound  depreciated?  Was  there  in- 
flation  in  Britain  and  if  so,  what  was  its  source? 
The  Bullionists,  led  by  David  Ricardo,  argued 
that  currency  depreciation  and  inflation  did  exist, 
that  the  overissue  of  bank  notes  by  the  Bank  of 
England  was  its  cause,  and  that  the  premium  quoted 
on bullion  (the  difference  between  the  market  and  the 
old  mint  price  of  gold  in  terms  of  paper  money)  was 
the  proof.  Price  indexes  not  being  in  use  then,  the 
Bullionists  used  the  gold  premium  as  we  use  price 
indexes  today  to  measure  the  extent  of  inflation. 
The  Bullionists  arrived  at  their  conclusions  via  the 
following  route:  the  quantity  of  money  determines 
domestic  prices;  domestic  prices  affect  the  exchange 
rate;  and  the  exchange  rate  between  inconvertible 
paper  and  gold  standard  currencies  determines  the 
premium  on  gold.  It  follows,  therefore,  that  the  de- 
preciation  of  the  exchange  rate  below  gold  parity 
(i.e.,  below  the  ratio  of the  respective  old mint  prices 
of  gold  in  each  country)  and  the  existence  of  the 
premium  on  bullion  both  constituted  evidence  that 
prices  were  higher  and  the  quantity  of money  greater 
in  Britain  than  would  have  been  the  case  had  the 
country  still  been  on  the  gold  standard. 
In  short,  the  depreciation  of  both  the  internal  and 
the  external  value  of  the  paper  pound  was  attributed 
solely  to  the  redundancy  of  money,  and  the  Bank  of 
England  was  reproached  for  having  taken  advantage 
of the  suspension  to  expand  its  note  issues  recklessly. 
Thus,  like  present  day  monetarists,  Bullionists  lo- 
cated  the  source  of  inflation  in the  central  bank.  But 
the  Bullionists  went  even  further,  charging  that  the 
Bank  was  also  responsible  for  the  external  specie 
drains  that  led  to  the  restriction  of  cash  payments. 
Bullionists  claimed  that  the  redundancy  of  notes,  by 
forcing  up  domestic  prices  relative  to  foreign  prices, 
had  caused  the  trade  balance  to  become  adverse,  thus 
forcing  gold  to  leave  the  country.  Here  is  the  quan- 
tity  theory  view  of  money  as  the  active  disturber  of 
economic  equilibrium. 
The  same  quantity  theory  reasoning  underlay  the 
Bullionists’  policy  prescription  for  restoring  converti- 
bility.  Bullionists  held  that  the  sole  prerequisite  for 
the  restoration  of  specie  payments  at  the  old  mint 
price  was  the  contraction  of  the  note  issue.  The  as- 
sumption  was  that  the  reduction  in  the  money  supply 
would  lower  internal  prices,  remove  the  trade  deficit, 
bring  the  exchanges  back  to  par,  and  eliminate  the 
premium  on  bullion.  With  sufficient  reduction  of 
the  note  issue,  convertibility  could  be restored  without 
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plete  the  country’s  bullion  reserve. 
Control  of  the  Money  Supply  In  the  main,  the 
theory  employed  by  the  Bullionists  in  locating  the 
source  of  inflation  was  the  same  quantity  theory  that 
they  had  inherited  from  their  pre-classical  predeces- 
sors.  It  would  be  wrong,  however,  to  assume  that 
the  Bullionists  did  not  add  anything  to  the  theory. 
Their  specific  contribution  related  to  the  question  of 
the  control  of  the  money  supply.  They  were  the  first 
to  develop  the  idea  that  the  stock  of  money,  or  at 
least  the  currency  component,  could  be  effectively 
regulated  via  the  control  of  a narrowly  defined  mone- 
tary  base.  This  point  was  first  brought  out  in  their 
treatment  of  the  relation  between  the  volume  of  Bank 
of  England  notes  and  the  note  issues  of  the  country 
banks.  The  money  supply  at  that  time  consisted  of 
gold  coin  and  the  note  liabilities  of  both  the  Bank  of 
England  and  country  banks.  The  link  between  the 
entire  money  supply  and  the  Bank  of  England’s  note 
component  might  have  appeared  tenuous  because  of 
the  possibility  of  the  country  bank  note  component 
expanding  and  contracting  independently  of  Bank  of 
England  notes.  But  the  Bullionists  denied  this  possi- 
bility  on  two  grounds.  First,  the  country  banks 
tended  to  keep  as  a  reserve  Bank  of  England  notes 
equal  to  a  relatively  constant  percentage  of  their  own 
note  liabilities.  Second,  any  overissue  of  country 
bank  notes  (and  consequent  rise  in  local  prices  rela- 
tive  to  London  prices)  would  drain  Bank  note  re- 
serves  from  the  countryside  to  London  via  a  regional 
balance  of payments  or  specie-flow  mechanism,  there- 
by  forcing  the  country  banks  to  contract  their  note 
issues.  For  these  reasons,  asserted  the  Bullionists, 
country  bank  notes  would  be  passively  tied  to  Bank 
of  England  notes  by  a  virtually  rigid  link  and  could 
expand  or  contract  only  if the  Bank’s  own  issues  did. 
This  is  the  origin  of  the  quantity  theory  view  that 
control  of  a  narrowly-defined  base  of  “high-powered 
money”  implies  virtual  control  of  the  money  supply. 
The  Currency-Banking  Debate  The  second  great 
19th  century  debate  in  which  the  quantity  theory 
played  a  leading  role  was  the  Currency-Banking 
controversy  over  the  question  of  the  regulation  of  the 
bank  note  issue.  This  debate  took  place  in  the  30- 
year  period  following  Britain’s  return  to  the  gold 
standard  in  1821.  The  main  policy  objectives  of  this 
period  included  maintenance  of  fixed  exchange  rates 
and  the  automatic  gold  convertibility  of  the  pound. 
Members  of  the  Currency  School,  applying  the  pre- 
cepts  of  their  Bullionist  forebears,  held  that  such 
preservation  of  the  gold  standard  could  be  secured 
only  through  rigid  adherence  to  the  “Currency  Prin- 
ciple”  of  making  the  existing  mixed  gold-paper  cur- 
rency  behave  exactly  as  would  a  wholly  metallic 
currency,  i.e.,  by  requiring  banknotes  to  expand  and 
contract  one  for  one  with  variations  in  gold  reserves. 
Given  the  desirability  of making  paper  money  behave 
exactly  like  a  metallic  one,  however,  by  what  means 
or  device  was  this  result  to  be  achieved?  By  the 
mere  requirement  of  gold  convertibility  alone?  Or 
by  the  imposition  of  even  stricter  rules  and  regula- 
tions  on  the  note  issue?  These  questions  constituted 
one  of  the  central  issues  of  the  controversy. 
Safeguards  to  Note  Overissue  : Convertibility  vs. 
Regulation  The  Bullionists  had  argued  earlier 
that  convertibility  as  such  would  be  sufficient  to  in- 
sure  that  banknotes  would  respond  automatically  to 
gold  flows  in  conformity  with  the  principle  that  the 
mixed  currency  should  behave  like  a  metallic  one. 
Convertibility  alone,  Bullionists  thought,  would  be  an 
adequate  safeguard  against  overissue.  If  too  many 
notes  were  issued,  they  reasoned,  then  according  to 
the  quantity  theory  the  value  of  the  notes  would  fall 
and  the  foreign  exchange  rate  would  depreciate. 
People  would  then  convert  notes  into  gold  for  export, 
and  the  consequent  loss  in  specie  reserves  would 
force  the  Bank  to  contract  its  note  issues. 
Members  of  the  Currency  School,  however,  re- 
garded  convertibility  as  an  inadequate  check  to  over- 
issue.  They  feared  that  even  a  legally  convertible 
currency  would  be issued  to  excess  with  the 
unfortunate  consequences  rising  domestic 
relative  to  prices  ;  balance  of 
ments  ;  foreign  exchange  gold  outflow 
depletion  of  reserves  ;  ultimately,  suspension 
convertibility.  The  of  reserve  would 
be  they  noted,  the  external  drain 
coincided  an  internal  as  domestic 
dents,  alarmed  the  possibility  suspension, 
sought  convert  paper  into  gold. 
Lags  and  Policy  Responses 
apprehensions  of  Currency  School 
from  its  that  the  actions  of  Bank  of 
had  been  and  destabilizing. 
destabilization  argument  the  adverse 
of  time  on  the  policy  response  gold 
outflows  to  exchange  movements.  Specifi- 
the  Currency  argued  that  lags 
existed  changes  in  volume  of  out- 
standing  consequent  changes  prices  and 
exchange  rate.  to  these  the  exchange 
would  be  in  registering  effect  of  note 
overissue  in  signaling  need  for  corrective 
contraction.  by  the  rate  indicator, 
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ing  note  issues  long  after  the  appropriate  time  for 
contraction. 
In  sum,  the  Currency  School  contended  that  long 
time-lags  affected  the  Bank’s  policy  response  to  gold 
drains.  Because  of these  delays,  the  Bank’s  reactions 
to  external  drains  often  came  too  late  to  protect  the 
specie  reserve  and  served  instead  to  weaken  public 
confidence  in  the  Bank’s  ability  to  maintain  converti- 
bility.  Moreover,  when  the  Bank  finally  did  apply 
restrictive  policies  to  stem  the  gold  losses,  these 
policy  actions  tended  to  coincide  with  and  to  exacer- 
bate  the  financial  panics  and  liquidity  crises  that 
inevitably  seemed  to  follow  periods  of  currency  and 
credit  excess.  In  short,  the  Currency  School  alleged 
that  the  Bank’s  policy  actions  had  accentuated,  rather 
than  alleviated,  economic  disturbances.  These  Cur- 
rency  School  arguments  foreshadowed  by  more  than 
100 years  Milton  Friedman’s  doctrine  that  the  prev- 
alence  of  long  lags  in  the  response  of  spending  and 
prices  to changes  in the  money  supply,  and,  to a lesser 
extent,  in  the  policymakers’  response  to  changes  in 
the  economy,  tend  to  render  discretionary  stabiliza- 
tion  efforts  destabilizing.  What  was  needed  to  pre- 
vent  the  recurrence  of  gold  drains,  exchange  depreci- 
ation,  and  domestic  liquidity  crisis,  the  Currency 
School  thought,  was  convertibility  plus  strict  regu- 
lation  of  the  volume  of  Bank  notes. 
Policy  Prescriptions  of  the  Currency  School  The 
Currency  School  was  successful  in  exacting  its  ideas 
into  legislation.  The  famous  Bank  Charter  Act  of 
1844  embodied  the  prescription  that,  except  for  a 
small  fixed  amount  of notes  that  the  Bank  could  issue 
against  government  securities,  new  notes  could  be 
emitted  only  if  the  Bank  had  received  an  equivalent 
amount  of gold.  In  modern  terminology,  the  Charter 
Act  established  a  marginal  gold  reserve  requirement 
of  100 percent  behind  note  issues.  With  notes  rigidly 
tied  to gold  in this  fashion,  external  gold  drains  would 
be  accompanied  by  reduction  of  a  like  amount  of 
notes  domestically. 
The  quantity  theory  clearly  underlay  the  Currency 
School’s  prescription  for  stabilizing  prices,  securing 
convertibility,  and  preserving  the  gold  standard  by 
tying  the  note  issue  to  gold.  For  this  prescription 
was  based  on  the  postulate  that  money  stock  changes 
cause  price  level  changes.  The  Currency  School  held 
that  the  channel  of  influence  ran  from  domestic  note 
overissue  to  rising  prices  to  a weakened  trade  balance 
and  deterioration  of  the  foreign  exchanges  and,  ulti- 
mately,  to  gold  outflows.  Similarly,  domestic  price 
rises  would  be  reversed  and  the  foreign  exchanges 
strengthened  by  reducing  the  note  issue.  By  tying 
notes  to gold  with  a  100 percent  reserve  requirement, 
the  money  stock  would  be  regulated  and,  conse- 
quently,  the  stability  of  the  external  value  of  the 
pound  would  be  achieved  automatically. 
Money  Substitutes  and  the  Effectiveness  of 
Monetary  Control  The  Currency  School  also 
contributed  to  the  quantity  theory  doctrine  that 
money  substitutes  cannot  impair  the  effectiveness  of 
monetary  regulation.  This  proposition  is  based  on 
two  underlying  presumptions  :  (1)  that  money,  the 
specific  control  instrument,  can  be  clearly  identified 
and  unambiguously  distinguished  from  money  sub- 
stitutes  and  (2)  that  money  and  near-money  are 
related  via  a  stable  link  so  that  variations  in  the 
former  will  be  accompanied  by  predictable  variations 
in  the  latter.  These  points  were  brought  out  in  the 
Currency  School’s  treatment  of  bank  notes  versus 
other  forms  of  circulating  media.  At  a  time  when 
bills  of  exchange  and  bank  deposits  were  being  em- 
ployed  increasingly  as  instruments  of  exchange,  Cur- 
rency  School  advocates  concentrated  solely  on  notes. 
They  insisted  that  money  be  defined  to  include  only 
coins  and  notes  and  that  monetary  regulation  be 
confined  to  notes.  They  felt  justified  in  excluding 
near-money  -bills  of  exchange  and  bank  deposits- 
from  their  policy  analysis.  They  thought  that  the 
entire  superstructure  of  money  substitutes  could  be 
regulated  effectively  by  control  of  the  money  (bank 
note)  base.  In  particular,  they  thought  that  the 
limitation  on  note  issues  constituted  an  ultimate  con- 
straint  on  the  creation  of deposits.  Hence,  rigid  con- 
trol  of the  former  implied  equally  rigid  control  of the 
latter.  Thus,  if notes  could  be controlled,  there  would 
be  no  need  for  explicit  control  of  deposits.  They 
defended  their  sharp  distinction  between  money 
(coin  and  notes)  and  near-money  (deposits  and  bills) 
on two  grounds.  First,  the  low circulation  velocity  of- 
near-moneys  rendered  those  instruments  quantita- 
tively  insignificant  relative  to  notes  as  exchange 
media.  Second,  in  times  of  financial  crises  near- 
moneys  were  poor  substitutes  for  money  strictly 
speaking,  because  only  the  latter  would  be  accepted 
in  final  payment.  Here,  in  the  Currency  School’s 
analysis,  is  the  origin  of  quantity  theorists’  tendency 
(1)  to  make  a  sharp  delineation  between  money  and 
other  liquid  assets  and  (2)  to  deny  that  near-moneys 
can  frustrate  the  effects  of  changes  in  the  money 
supply. 
ANTI-QUANTITY  THEORY  VIEWS 
A Catalogue  of  Criticisms  There  has  long  been  a 
body  of  doctrine  opposed  to  the  quantity  theory. 
At  one  time  or  another  each  of  the  following  criti- 
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criticisms  are  neither  mutually  exclusive  nor  are  they 
always  consistent  :  There  is  some  overlapping  and 
some  conflict. 
(1)  Modern  Keynesians  argue  that  the  quantity 
theory  is  invalid  because  it  assumes  an  automatic 
tendency  to  full  employment.  If  resource  unem- 
ployment  and  excess  capacity  exist,  a  monetary 
expansion,  if  effective,  may  produce  a  rise  in  out- 
put  rather  than  a  rise  in  prices.  More  generally, 
money  may  be  more  than  just  a  veil.  Monetary 
changes  may  have  a  permanent  effect  on  output, 
interest  rates,  and  other  real  variables,  contrary  to 
the  neutrality  postulate  of  the  quantity  theory. 
(2)  Post-Keynesian  economists  also  contend  that 
the  quantity  theory  erroneously  assumes  the  sta- 
bility  of  velocity  and  its  counterpart,  the  demand 
for  money.  In  fact,  velocity  is  a  volatile,  unpre- 
dictable  variable,  influenced  by  expectations,  un- 
certainty,  and  by  changes  in  the  volume  of  money 
substitutes.  The  erratic  behavior  of  velocity  makes 
it  impossible  to  predict  the  effect  that  a  given 
monetary  change  will  have  on  prices.  Changes  in 
velocity  may  offset  (negate)  or  accentuate  the 
price-level  impact  of  a  monetary  change. 
(3)  Nineteenth  century  proponents  of  the  so-called 
real  bills  doctrine  argued  that,  contrary  to  the 
quantity  theory,  the  money  supply  is  an  endogenous 
variable  that  responds  passively  to  shifts  in  the 
demand  for  it.  One  implication  is  that  monetary 
changes  cannot  influence  prices.  Being  demand- 
determined,  the  stock  of  money  cannot  exceed  or 
fall  short  of  the  quantity  of  money  demanded.  And 
with  the  quantity  of  money  supplied  always  identi- 
cal  to  the  quantity  demanded,  no  situation  of 
excess  supply  or  redundancy  of  money  can  ever 
develop  to  stimulate  spending  and  force  up  prices. 
In  short,  there  is  no  transmission  mechanism  run- 
ning  from  money  to  prices. 
(4)  In  fact,  claimed  real  bill  advocates,  the  chan- 
nel  of  influence  runs  in  the  opposite  direction. 
Causation  flows  from  prices  and  income  to  money, 
rather  than  vice  versa.  Income  and  prices  deter- 
mine  the  demand  for  money,  which,  in  turn,  deter- 
mines  the  money  supply.  And  since  the  money 
supply  is  the  result  and  not  the  cause  of  variations 
in  income,  prices  and  spending,  it  follows  that 
monetary  changes  cannot  be  the  source  of  inflation, 
deflation,  and  other  economic  disturbances.  Hence, 
the  quantity  theorists’  monetary  interpretation  of 
inflation,  balance  of  payments  disequilibrium,  and 
business  cycles  must  be  wrong.  Analysts  should 
instead  seek  for  the  sources  of  economic  disruptions 
in  real  (non-monetary)  causes. 
(5)  A  host  of  critics,  both  modern  and  old,  have 
maintained  that,  contrary  to  the  quantity  theory, 
a  monetary  injection  cannot  always  be  relied  upon 
to  stimulate  spending  and  increase  prices.  A  mone- 
tary  expansion  may  be ineffective  for  at  least  three 
reasons.  First,  the  new  money  may  simply  be 
absorbed  into  idle  hoards.  Second,  spending  may 
be  interest-insensitive,  i.e.,  unresponsive  to  changes 
in  interest  rates  induced  by  the  monetary  expan- 
sion.  Third,  as  previously  mentioned,  the  money 
stock  may  be  demand-determined,  in  which  case 
there  can  be  no  excess  supply  of  money  to  spill 
over  into  the  commodity  market  in  the  form  of  an 
excess  demand  for  goods. 
Many  of  these  criticisms  originated  in  the  contra- 
quantity  theory  doctrines  of  the  19th  century  adver- 
saries  of  the  Bullionists  and  the  Currency  School. 
Antibullionist  Opposition  to  the  Quantity  Theory 
Opposition  to  the  quantity  theory  emerged  early  in 
the  Bullionist  debate  in  the  form  of  the  Antibullion- 
ists’  critique  of  the  Bullionists’  policy  analysis.  At 
least  two  contra-quantity  theory  arguments  can  be 
identified  in  the  Antibullionist  position.  First  is 
the  rejection  of  a  monetary  for  a  non-monetary  ex- 
planation  of  economic  disturbance.  In  opposition  to 
the  Bullionists’  contention  that  both  the  gold  prem- 
ium  and  the  depreciation  of  the  paper  pound  were 
attributable  to  the  overissue  of  currency,  the  Anti- 
bullionists  maintained  that  the  rise  in  the  prices  of 
bullion  and  foreign  exchange  were  due  to  an  unfavor- 
able  balance-of-payments  stemming  from  non-mone- 
tary  causes,  notably  domestic  crop  failures  and  heavy 
military  outlays  abroad.  Moreover,  Antibullionists 
denied  that  excessive  money  creation  was  the  cause 
of  the  gold  outflow  and  suspension  of  convertibility. 
Similarly,  they  doubted  that  mere  contraction  of  the 
note  issue  would  be  sufficient  to  permit  resumption. 
They  argued  that  reduction  of  imports  and  curtail- 
ment  of  war-related  foreign  expenditures  were  the 
essential  prerequisites  for  the  restoration  of  the  gold 
standard.  This  argument  is  the  essence  of  the  anti- 
quantity  theory  view  that  economic  disturbances  stem 
from  non-monetary  causes  and  require  non-monetary 
cures. 
Second,  Antibullionists  employed  the  real  bills 
doctrine  to  assert  the  impossibility  of  an  excess 
supply  of  money  ever  developing  to  exert  upward 
pressures  on  prices.  The  real  bills  doctrine  states 
that  just  the  right  amount  of  money  and  credit  will 
be created  if bank  loans  are  made  only  for  productive 
(nonspeculative)  purposes.  Defending  the  Bank  of 
England  against  the  Bullionists’  charge  of  note  over- 
issue,  Antibullionists  argued  that  excessive  issues 
were  impossible  as  long  as  the  Bank’s  note  liabilities 
were  based  on  sound  commercial  paper,  i.e.,  were 
issued  only  to  finance  genuine  production  and  trade. 
The  real  bills  criterion,  Antibullionists  contended, 
would  insure  that  the  volume  of currency  would  adapt 
itself  automatically  to  the  needs  of  trade.  Bank 
notes  issued  to finance  the  production  of goods  would 
be  extinguished  when  the  goods  were  marketed  and 
the  real  bills  were  retired  (loans  were  repaid)  with 
the  sales  proceeds.  Since  money  creation  would  be 
limited  to  the  expansion  of  real  output,  no  inflation 
could  occur.  Here  is  the  origin  of  the  contra- 
quantity  theory  notion  that  the  stock  of  money  is 
solely  demand-determined  and  therefore  can  have  no 
independent  influence  on  spending  and  prices. 
Anti-Quantity  Theory  Views  of  the  Banking 
School  The  main  attack  on  the  quantity  theory, 
however,  was  launched  by  the  Banking  School  in  its 
debate  with  the  Currency  School.  Led  by  Thomas 
Tooke,  John  Fullarton,  and  James  Wilson,  Banking 
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all  of  the  propositions  of  the  quantity  theory.  They 
denied  that  monetary  expansion  or  contraction  would 
affect  prices.  They  argued  that  changes  in the  supply 
of  money  and  credit  could  not  be  expected  to  influ- 
ence  spending  and  prices  for  two  reasons.  First,  new 
money  may  simply  be  absorbed  into  idle  balances 
without  entering  the  spending  stream.  Second,  the 
supply  of  money  is  determined  by  the  needs  of  trade 
and  thus  can  never  exceed  demand. 
The  first  point  was  brought  out  in the  discussion  of 
gold  hoards.  The  Banking  School  alleged  that  great 
accumulations  of  idle  money  existed  in  the  form  of 
hoards  of  precious  metals.  These  hoards  supposedly 
were  held  mainly  by  the  banks  as  excess  bullion  re- 
serves.  The  full  impact  of  gold  flows,  it  was  argued, 
would  be  absorbed  entirely  by  those  hoards  without 
affecting  the  amount  of  currency  in  circulation.  Im- 
ports  of  monetary  gold  would  augment  the  hoards 
without  causing  an  increase  in  the  circulating  media 
or  inducing  a rise  in  spending.  Similarly,  an  outflow 
of gold  would  be  withdrawn  from  the  bullion  hoards, 
but  would  have  no  effect  on  the  monetary  circulation 
or  the  volume  of  expenditure. 
The  second  point  was  brought  out  in  the  Banking 
School’s  discussion  of  the  real  bills  doctrine  and  the 
law  of  reflux.  Like  its  Antibullionist  predecessors, 
the  Banking  School  contended  that  currency  over- 
issue  was  impossible  as  long  as  banks  restricted  their 
loans  to  self-liquidating  commercial  or  agricultural 
paper.  But  the  Banking  School  went  further  than 
the  Antibullionists,  arguing  that  even  if  the  real  bills 
criterion  were  violated,  the  law  of  reflux  would  oper- 
ate  to  prevent  overissue.  If  notes  were  emitted  in 
excess  of  legitimate  working  capital  needs,  the  public 
would  not  wish  to  hold  the  excess  notes  and  would 
deposit  them,  use  them  to  repay  bank  loans,  or  re- 
deem  them  for  coin.  In  any  case,  the  excess  notes 
would  be  returned  immediately  to  the  banks.  In 
brief,  the  real  bills  criterion  together  with  the  reflux 
mechanism  would  provide  a  sufficient  check  to  over- 
issue.  Notice  how  the  Banking  School,  in  rejecting 
the  possibility  of  an  excess  supply  of  money  and 
credit,  also  denied  the  validity  of  the  monetary  trans- 
mission  mechanism  propounded  by  the  quantity 
theory.  According  to  the  latter,  an  excess  supply  of 
money  is what  induces  the  excess  demand  for  goods 
that  bids  up  prices,  i.e.,  following  a  monetary  injec- 
tion,  people  try  to  get  rid  of  undesired  additional 
money  holdings  by  spending  them.  This  adjustment 
mechanism,  however,  was  implicitly  denied  by  the 
Banking  School’s  insistence  that  the  supply  of  money 
is always  identically  equal  to  the  demand  for  it. 
In  its  opposition  to  the  quantity  theory,  the  Bank- 
ing  School  developed  its  own  non-monetary  theory 
of  the  price  level.  Thomas  Tooke  stated  explicitly 
that  the  general  level  of  prices  was  determined  by 
incomes  (wages,  rents,  profits,  etc.),  and  not  by  the 
quantity  of money.  Tooke’s  argument  was  that  factor 
incomes,  rather  than  money,  are  the  sources  of  ex- 
penditures  that  act  on  prices.  This  is  an  early  ver- 
sion  of  the  income-expenditure  approach  to  mone- 
tary  theory,  an  approach  that  formulates  its  analysis 
in  terms  of  the  determinants  of  aggregate  demand 
rather  than  in  terms  of  the  quantity  of  money  or  the 
velocity  of  circulation.  The  income-expenditure  ap- 
proach  was  later  developed  by  Keynes,  and  continues 
to  be  a  characteristic  feature  of  Keynesian  macro- 
economic  models. 
Tooke  did  not  explain  how  these  price-determining 
factor  incomes  themselves  were  determined  but  left 
the  question  of  their  origin  open  to  a  variety  of 
possible  interpretations.  His  theory  of price  inflation 
is therefore  also  suggestive  of  recent  wage-cost-push 
and  structural  theories  that  (1)  link  inflation  to  some 
arbitrary  non-monetary  element  in  the  institutional 
environment,  e.g.,  autonomous  increases  in  wage  in- 
comes,  production  bottlenecks,  particular  supply  in- 
elasticities,  institutional  price  rigidities,  etc.,  and  (2) 
stress  the  inflationary  role  of the  competitive  struggle 
for  relative  shares  in  the  national  income. 
Factor  incomes  were  not  the  only  price-influencing 
forces  discussed  by  the  Banking  School.  Changes  in 
profit  anticipations  also  were  mentioned  frequently. 
What  was  stressed,  however,  was  the  non-monetary 
nature  of these  expectational  influences.  This  empha- 
sis  reflects  the  contra-quantity  theory  tendency  to 
attribute  price  level  movements  to  non-monetary 
forces  rather  than  to  changes  in  the  money  supply. 
The  Banking  School  also  disputed  the  quantity 
theory  view  of  money  as  an  exogenous  or  indepen- 
dent  variable.  Banking  School  writers  argued  that  the 
stock  of  money  and  credit  is  a  passive,  endogenous, 
demand-determined  variable-the  effect,  not  the 
cause,  of  price  changes.  Contrary  to  the  Currency 
School’s  contention  that  the  channel  of  influence  runs 
from  money  to  prices,  the  Banking  School  argued 
that  the  channel  of  causation  runs  in  the  opposite 
direction.  That  is, when  prices,  total  money  income, 
and  aggregate  demand  are  increasing,  the  demand  for 
loans  would  rise  and  the  banking  system  would 
accommodate  the  increased  loan  demand  by  supply- 
ing  additional  credit  and  circulating  media.  In  the 
determination  of  the  volume  of currency  in  existence, 
the  non-bank  public  (borrowers)  played  the  active 
role  and  banks  (issuers  of  money)  the  passive  or 
accommodating  role.  Implicit  in  the  Banking 
School’s  view  of  passive  money  are  three  anti-quan- 
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activity  precede  and  cause  changes  in  the  money 
supply  (the  so-called  reverse-causation  argument), 
(2)  the  supply  of  circulating  media  is  not  inde- 
pendent  of  the  demand  for  it,  and  (3)  the  central 
bank  does  not  actively  control  the  money  supply  but 
instead  accommodates  or  responds  to  prior  changes 
in  the  demand  for  money. 
Concerning  the  problem  of  money  and  money  sub- 
stitutes,  the  Banking  School  disputed  the  quantity 
theory  view  that  control  of  the  former  implied  control 
of  the  latter.  Contrary  to  the  Currency  School’s 
stress  on a narrowly-defined  money  supply,  the  Bank- 
ing  School  tended  to  emphasize  the  overall  structure 
of  credit.  The  Banking  School  criticized  the  Cur- 
rency  School’s  attempts  to  draw  a  hard  and  fast  line 
between  money  and  near-money.  The  Banking  School 
argued  that  the  ready  availability  of  bank  deposits, 
bills  of  exchange,  and  other  forms  of  credit  instru- 
ments  that  could  circulate  in  lieu  of  money  would 
defeat  the  Currency  School’s  efforts  to  control  the 
entire  credit  superstructure  via  control  of  the  bank- 
note  base.  The  Banking  School  thought  that  the 
volume  of  credit  that  could  be  erected  on  a  given 
monetary  base  was  large,  variable,  and  unpredictable. 
The  total  volume  of  credit,  it  was  argued,  is  inde- 
pendent  of,  as  well  as  quantitatively  more  significant 
than,  the  money  stock.  Here  is  an  early  example  of 
two  more  anti-quantity  theory  notions,  i.e.,  (1)  the 
difficulty  of  making  a  watertight  distinction  between 
money  and  near-moneys,  and  (2)  the  ineffectiveness 
of  policy  attempts  to  stabilize  prices  via  control  of 
the  stock  of  money  in  a  financial  system  that  can 
produce  an  endless  array  of  money  substitutes. 
The  contra-quantity  theory  views  of  the  Banking 
School  strongly  influenced  its  position  on  at  least 
three  important  policy  questions.  First,  on  the  ques- 
tion  of  free  versus  regulated  banking,  the  Banking 
School  advocated  more  free  trade  and  less  regulation 
in banking  than  did  the  Currency  School.  The  Bank- 
ing  School  thought  that  the  quantity  of  money  and 
credit  would  best  govern  itself  automatically  through 
the  force  of people’s  self-interest.  Thus,  if the  supply 
of  money  is  determined  by  the  needs  of  trade  and  is 
automatically  regulated  by  the  reflux  mechanism, 
there  was  no need  for  intervention  in the  form  of gov- 
ernment  legislation  such  as  that  proposed  by  the 
Currency  School.  Second,  on  the  question  of  rules 
versus  discretion  in  the  control  of  the  money  supply, 
the  Banking  School  generally  was  in  favor  of  dis- 
cretionary  judgment  of  bankers  as  opposed  to  rules 
of  government.  The  Currency  School  had  advocated 
that  discretionary  policy  be  replaced  by  a  fixed  rule, 
i.e., the  100 percent  marginal  reserve  requirement  for 
banknote  issues.  But  the  Banking  School  held  that 
banks  should  not  be  constrained  by  a  rigid  rule:, 
because  the  optimum  quantity  of  money  would  be 
forthcoming  automatically  if  the  banks  themselves 
regulated  their  note  and  deposit  liabilities  by  re- 
sponding  to  the  needs  of  trade.  Third,  on  the  ques- 
tion  of  the  rationale  of  monetary  policy,  the  Banking 
School  regarded  attempts  to  regulate  prices  via 
monetary  control  as  both  futile  and  pointless.  In 
the  first  place,  the  money  supply  (especially  the  note 
component)  is an  endogenous  variable  not  subject  to 
exogenous  control.  And  even  if  the  narrow  money 
supply  could  be controlled,  the  total  paper  circulation 
(total  credit),  a  more  comprehensive  magnitude  that 
is  interchangeable  with  money,  cannot  be  so  con- 
trolled.  Finally,  the  Banking  School  argued  that  to 
propose  regulation  of  the  price  level  via  control  of 
money  and  credit  is  to  put  the  cart  before  the  horse. 
For  it  is prices  that  determine  the  quantity  of  money 
and  credit,  and  not  vice  versa. 
THE NEO-CLASSICAL  REFORMULATION 
Despite  the  Banking  School’s  criticisms,  the 
quantity  theory  emerged  from  the  mid-19th  century 
Currency-Banking  debate  to  command  widespread 
acceptance.  Moreover,  in  academic  circles  at  least, 
it  continued  to  reign  as  the  dominant  monetary 
theory  until  the  1930’s.  Several  factors  may  have 
contributed  to  the  success  of  the  theory.  For  one 
thing,  the  Currency  School’s  policy  recommendations 
of fixed  exchanges,  maintenance  of the  gold  standard, 
currency  convertibility,  and  strict  control  of  bank- 
notes  became  part  of  British  monetary  orthodoxy  in 
the  second  half  of  the  nineteenth  century.  Since  the 
quantity  theory  had  provided  the  theoretical  founda- 
tion  for  these  policy  prescriptions,  it  was  only  natural 
that  it  also  was  elevated  to  the  rank  of  established 
orthodoxy.  Then,  too,  there  may  have  been  some  de- 
cline  in the  prestige  of the  opposing  real  bills doctrine. 
Long  before  the  end  of  the  century  quantity  theorists 
had  exposed  the  fallacies  of  the  real  bills  criterion  as 
an  automatic  regulator  of the  money  supply.  Quantity 
theorists  had  demonstrated  that  as  long  as  the  loan 
rate  of  interest  is  below  the  expected  yield  on  new 
capital  projects,  the  demand  for  loans  would  be  in- 
satiable.  In  such  a  case  the  real  bills  criterion 
would  provide  no  effective  limit  to  the  quantity  of, 
money  in  existence.  Probably  the  most  important 
contributing  factor,  however,  was the  rigorous  mathe- 
matical  restatement  of  the  quantity  theory  provided 
by  neo-classical  economists  around  the  turn  of  the 
century.  Representing  a substantial  refinement,  sys- 
tematization,  and  extension  of  the  earlier  Classical 
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stantially  to  the  intellectual  appeal  and  scientific  pres- 
tige  of  the  theory. 
Neo-Classical  Contributions  The  neo-classical  re- 
formulation  of  the  quantity  theory  consisted  of  at 
least  three  separate  contributions.  First,  there  was 
the  mathematical  framework  that  neo-classical  econo- 
mists  employed  to  expound  and  empirically  test  the 
key  propositions  of  the  theory.  This  mathematical 
framework  took  two  alternative  forms,  namely 
(1)  Irving  Fisher’s  famous  equation  of  exchange, 
MV  =  PT,  where M  is  the  stock  of  money,  V  is 
velocity  of  circulation,  P  is  the  price  level,  and  T  is 
the  physical  volume  of  market  transactions  ;  and 
(2)  the  celebrated  Cambridge  cash  balance  equation, 
M =  kPy,  where  M is the  stock  of money  in circula- 
tion,  k  is the  desired  cash  balance  ratio,  i.e.,  the  ratio 
of  the  nominal  money  supply  to  nominal  income,  P 
is  the  price  level  of  the  national  product,  and  y  is 
real  national  income  or  the  national  product  valued 
at  constant  prices.  Using  these  equations,  neo-clas- 
sical  analysts  were  able to  spell  out  precisely  the  con- 
ditions  that  must  hold  if the  proportionality  postulate 
is to  be  valid. 
As explained  by the  neo-classical  quantity  theorists, 
these  conditions  included  constancy  of  the  velocity  of 
money  and  of  real  output.  Neo-classical  economists 
held  that  velocity  was  a  near-constant  determined  by 
individuals’  cash-holding  decisions  in  conjunction 
with  technological  and  institutional  factors  associated 
with  the  aggregate  payments  mechanism.  More 
specifically,  it  was  argued  that  individuals  would 
try  to  keep  non-interest-bearing  transactions  balances 
to  the  minimum  necessary  to  finance  day  to  day 
purchases  and  to  provide  a  reserve  for  contingencies. 
The  minimum  balances  that  individuals  would  need 
to  hold,  and  by  implication,  the  rate  of  circulation  of 
money,  would  depend  on  such  factors  as  the  state  of 
development  of  the  banking  system,  frequency  of  re- 
ceipts  and  disbursements,  length  of  the  payment 
period,  degree  of  synchronization  of cash  inflows  and 
outflows,  rapidity  of  transportation  and  communica- 
tion,  etc.  Since  these  factors  were  thought  to  be 
subject  to  only  gradual,  evolutionary  change,  both 
velocity  and  the  Cambridge  k,  it  was  argued,  could 
be  treated  as  virtual  constants  in  the  neo-classical 
quantity  equations.  Output  and  transactions,  too, 
were  regarded  as  constants  determined  by  full-ca- 
pacity  utilization  of  available  resources  and  tech- 
nology. 
The  policy  implications  of  the  neo-classical  for- 
mulation  were  clear  :  monetary  policy  could  be  ex- 
pected  to  exert  a  powerful,  predictable  influence on 
prices.  With  velocity,  V,  and  transactions,  T,  both 
regarded  as constants,  Fisher’s  equation  of  exchange 
could  be expressed  in  a  form,  P  =  (V/T)  M =  (con- 
stant)  M,  showing  a  constant  proportional  relation- 
ship  between  average  prices  and  the  money  stock. 
Embodying  the  proportionality  postulate,  this  ex- 
pression  implied  that  a  policy-engineered  percentage 
change  in the  money  stock  would  cause  the  same  per- 
centage  change  in  the  price  level. 
The  second  neo-classical  contribution  was  the 
formalization,  elaboration,  and  extension  of  the 
Bullionist-Currency  School  ideas  on  control  of  the 
money  supply.  Irving  Fisher,  A.  C. Pigou,  and  other 
neo-classical  analysts  demonstrated  that  monetary 
control  could  be  achieved  in  a  fractional  reserve 
banking  system  via  control  of  an  exogenously  de- 
termined  stock  of high-powered  money.  They  argued 
that  the  total  stock  of  money  (coin  and  notes)  and 
bank  deposits  would  be  a  constant  multiple  of  the 
monetary  base.  Underlying  their  argument  were  the 
assumptions  that  banks  desire  to  hold  a  fixed  pro- 
portion  of  their  deposits  as  reserves  and  that  the 
public  desires  to  maintain  a  constant  ratio  of  cash 
holdings  to  demand  deposits.  In  short,  they  argued 
that  the  stock  of  money  is  governed  by  three  proxi- 
mate  determinants  :  (1)  the  high-powered  monetary 
base,  (2)  the  bank’s  desired  reserve-to-deposit  ratio, 
and  (3)  the  public’s  desired  cash-to-deposit  ratio,  and 
that  the  monetary  base  dominates  the  latter  two  de- 
terminants. 
Finally,  neo-classical  quantity  theorists  stressed 
the  short-run  non-neutrality  of  money,  a  topic  that 
had  been  relatively  neglected  in  the  classical  analysis. 
Neo-classical  writers  integrated  the  quantity  theory 
into  their  analysis  of  business  cycles,  showing  how 
changes  in  the  quantity  of  money  were  a  major 
cause  of  booms  and  slumps  and  how  monetary  regu- 
lation  of  the  price  level  was  a  prerequisite  to  the 
stabilization  of  economic  activity. 
So  influential  was  the  neo-classical  formulation  of 
the  quantity  theory  that  it  continued  to  serve  as  the 
standard  macroeconomic  model  in  use  up  to  the 
1930’s.  In  that  decade,  however,  it  encountered 
heavy  criticism  and,  discredited,  was  supplanted  by 
the  Keynesian  income-expenditure  model. 
THE  KEYNESIAN-MONETARIST  CONTROVERSY 
The  Bullionist  and  Currency-Banking  controversies 
represent  the  leading  19th  century  examples  of  the 
recurrent  debate  over  the  quantity  theory.  The  lead- 
ing  example  of  the  debate  in  the  present  century, 
however,  is  the  controversy  that  has  been  raging 
since  the  mid-1930’s  between  the  anti-quantity  theory 
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mediate  followers,  and  later  neo-  or  post-Keynesians 
on  the  one  hand,  and  their  pro-quantity  theory  an- 
tagonists,  the  monetarists,  on  the  other.  The  debate 
erupted  in  1936  with  Keynes,  in  his  classic,  The 
General  Theory  of  Employment,  Interest,  and 
money,  leveling  a  barrage  of  criticism  at  the 
quantity  theory. 
The  Keynesian  Attack  Keynes’s  attack  on  the 
quantity  theory  consisted  of  five  interrelated  ele- 
ments.  First,  he  argued  that  the  quantity  theory 
assumed  an  automatic  tendency  of  the  economy  to 
operate  at  full  capacity,  an  assumption  patently  at 
odds  with  experience  in  the  depressed  1930’s.  Only 
if  production  and  employment  are  fixed  at  full  ca- 
pacity,  said  Keynes,  would  monetary-induced  changes 
in  spending  manifest  themselves  solely  in  price  level 
changes.  But,  he added,  if the  economy  were  operat- 
ing  at  less  than  full  employment,  with  idle  resources 
to  draw  from,  changes  in  spending  would  affect  out- 
put  and  employment  rather  than  prices.  Thus,  in 
much  of  his  analysis  of  the  economics  of  depression, 
Keynes  reversed  the  assumptions  of  the  quantity 
theory,  treating  prices  as  rigid  and  output  as  flexi- 
ble.  He  rationalized  his  assumption  of  price  rigidity 
by  arguing  that  prices  are  governed  by  wage  costs, 
and  that  union  bargaining  strength  and  other  in- 
stitutional  forces  prevent  wages  from  being  down- 
wardly  flexible  even  in  depressions.  Thus  his  argu- 
ment  reflected  the  anti-quantity  theory  view  that  the 
price  level  is  determined  by  autonomously  given 
factor  costs  rather  than  by  the  quantity  of  money. 
Second,  Keynes  criticized  the  particular  version  of 
the  quantity  theory  expressed  in  the  neo-classical 
quantity  equations  on  the  grounds  (1)  that  it  was 
a  tautological  identity  rather  than  an  empirically 
refutable  hypothesis,  and  (2)  that  it  erroneously 
treated  the  circulation  velocity  of  money  as  a  near- 
constant.  Keynes  contended  that,  in  actuality,  the 
velocity  variable  in  Fisher’s  equation  of  exchange 
was  extremely  unstable  and  that  it  might  passively 
adapt  to  independent  changes  in  the  other  elements 
of  the  equation.  Thus,  said  Keynes,  the  impact  of 
any  change  in  M  might  be  absorbed  by  an  offsetting 
change  in  V  and  therefore  would  not  be  transmitted 
to  P.  Likewise,  any  change  in income  or  the  volume 
of  market  transactions  might  be  accommodated  by 
a  change  in  velocity  without  requiring  any  change 
in  the  money  supply. 
Third,  Keynes  revived  the  Banking  School  con- 
clusion  concerning  the  futility  of  using  monetary 
policy  to  regulate  economic  activity.  Keynes  held 
that  monetary  policy  would  be  an  ineffective  cure 
for  unemployment  and  recession  for  two  reasons. 
First,  monetary  injections  might  be  absorbed  im- 
mediately  into  idle  hoards  without  lowering  interest 
rates  sufficiently  to  stimulate  investment  spending. 
This  conclusion  was  based  on  Keynes’s  theory  of  an 
absolute  preference  for  liquidity  at  low  interest  rate 
levels,  i.e.,  the  case  of  the  so-called  liquidity  trap. 
The  theory  of  the  liquidity  trap  stated  that  under 
certain  circumstances  -  e.g.,  a  severe  depression 
characterized  by  an  abnormally  low  rate  of  interest 
and  by  virtually  unanimous  expectations  of  capital 
losses  owing  to  anticipated  rises  in  bond  yields  and. 
declines  in  bond  prices  -  idle  cash  balances  become 
perfect  substitutes  for  bonds  in  wealthholders’  port- 
folios.  That  is,  when  the  anticipated  capital  loss  on 
bonds  is  large  enough  to  at  least  offset  the  low  cur- 
rent  interest  return,  there  would  be  no  inherent  ad- 
vantage  to  holding  bonds  rather  than  zero-yield  cash,. 
Consequently,  the  quantity  of  money  demanded 
would  become  insatiable,  i.e.,  infinitely  sensitive  to 
the  slightest  change  in  the  rate  of  interest.  In  this 
liquidity  trap  case,  only  minute  reductions  in  interest 
rates  would  be  necessary  to  induce  portfolio  op- 
timizers  to  hold  virtually  any  amount  of  additional 
cash  injected  into  the  system.  Increases  in  the 
money  supply,  therefore,  would  be  ineffective  in  re- 
ducing  interest  rates  and  thus  in  stimulating  invest- 
ment  spending  via  the  interest  rate  channel.  Here  is 
the  reappearance  of  the  Banking  School  argument 
that  a  monetary  expansion  cannot  be  counted  on  to 
stimulate  spending  because  the  new  money  may 
simply  disappear  into  idle  hoards.  Second,  Keynes 
argued  that  even  if monetary  injections  were  success- 
ful  in  lowering  market  interest  rates,  those  injections 
still  would  not  stimulate  economic  activity  if  invest- 
ment  spending  was  unresponsive  to  changes  in  in- 
terest  rates.  To  summarize,  Keynes  argued  that 
either  a  liquidity  trap  or  an  interest-insensitive  in- 
vestment  expenditure  schedule  could  render  a  mone- 
tary  expansion  ineffective  in  a  depression.  In  terms 
of  Fisher’s  equation  of  exchange,  MV  =  PT,  a  rise 
in  M  would  be  offset  by  a  fall  in  V,  leaving  total 
spending,  PT,  unchanged.  With  variable  velocity 
absorbing  all  the  impact  of  money  stock  changes, 
none  would  be  transmitted  to  nominal  income.  The 
rigid  links  between  money,  spending,  prices,  and 
nominal  income  postulated  by  the  quantity  theory 
would  be  severed  or  severely  weakened. 
Fourth,  like  Thomas  Tooke,  Keynes  argued  that 
the  income-expenditure  analysis  was  superior  to  the 
quantity  theory  as  an  analytical  model.  Keynes’s 
model  emphasized  the  determinants  of  expenditure 
rather  than  the  quantity  of  money.  Moreover,  it 
stressed  a  new  non-monetary  adjustment  mechanism 
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old  direct  and  indirect  monetary  linkages.  Speci- 
fically,  Keynes  argued  that  there  is  a  multiplier  re- 
lationship  between  autonomous  expenditure  (i.e., 
non-income-induced  expenditures,  e.g.,  government 
outlays  for  armaments  or  public  works  projects)  and 
total  income,  such  that  a  dollar  change  in  the  former 
will  stimulate  a  two  or  three  dollar  change  in  the 
latter.  The  Keynesian  emphasis  on  the  determinants 
of  spending  rather  than  the  stock  of  money  was 
clearly  in  the  tradition  of  Thomas  Tooke.  The  chief 
policy  implication  of  the  Keynesian  income-expendi- 
ture  analysis  was  that  fiscal  policy  would  have  a more 
powerful  impact  on  income  and  employment  than 
would  monetary  policy.  Accordingly,  Keynesians 
argued  that  chief  reliance  should  be  placed  on  gov- 
ernment  budgetary  (tax  and  expenditure)  policy 
rather  than  on  monetary  policy  to  stabilize  the  econ- 
omy. 
Finally,  Keynes  adhered  to  a  non-monetary  ex- 
planation  of  the  Great  Depression,  arguing  that  the 
downswing  had  been  triggered  by  a  collapse  of 
capital  spending  stemming  from  the  disappearance 
of  profitable  investment  opportunities,  and  that  the 
contraction  had  been  intensified  by  a  collapse  of 
confidence.  Here  is  a  restatement  of  the  Anti- 
bullionist-Banking  School  notion  that  economic  dis- 
turbances  arise  from  exogenous  shocks  originating 
in  the  real  sector  rather  than  from  erratic  behavior 
of  the  money  supply. 
Post-Keynesian  Extensions  To  Keynes’s  list  of 
anti-quantity  theory  arguments,  neo-Keynesian  eco- 
nomists  writing  in  the  inflationary  environment  of 
the  post-World  War  II  period  added  others.  One 
was  the  view  that  inflation  is  predominantly  a  cost- 
push  phenomenon  associated  with  union  bargaining 
strength,  monopoly  power,  administered  or  mark-up 
pricing  policies,  and  other  non-monetary  institutional 
forces  that  contribute  to  autonomous  increases  in 
labor  and  other  factor  costs.  Another  was  the  view, 
espoused  by  “cheap-money”  advocates,  that  ex- 
pansionary  monetary  policy  could  be  used  to  peg 
interest  rates  at  low  levels,  thus  minimizing  the  in- 
terest  burden  of  the  public  debt.  An  alternative  ver- 
sion  of  the  same  argument,  associated  with  the 
Phillips  Curve  approach  to  policy  questions,  held 
that  monetary  policy  could  help  peg  the  unemploy- 
ment  rate  at permanently  low levels.  These  latter  two 
arguments  conflict  with  the  neutrality  proposition 
that  holds  that  money  can  have  no  permanent  in- 
fluence  on  real  variables. 
Perhaps  the  strongest  anti-quantity  theory  views, 
however,  were  those  contained  in  the  Radcliffe  Com- 
mittee’s  revival  and  restatement  of  the  Banking 
School’s  position  on  the  problem  of  money  and  near- 
moneys.  Representing  the  apogee  of  post-Keynesian 
skepticism  of  the  relevancy  of  the  quantity  theory, 
the  Radcliffe  Report  concluded  (1)  that  money  is  a 
practically  indistinguishable  component  of  a  virtually 
continuous  spectrum  of  financial  assets  ;  (2)  that  the 
velocity  of  money  is  a  mere  arithmetic  computation 
devoid  of  volitional  meaning  or  economic  content; 
and  (3)  that  attempts  to  regulate  spending  via 
monetary  control  are  inherently  futile  in  a  financial 
system  that  can  economize  on  money  by  producing 
a  limitless  array  of  money  substitutes.  Liquidity,  or 
the  total  of  all  assets  performing  some  monetary 
function,  was  said  to  be  the  key  determinant  of 
spending.  This  variable,  it  was  argued,  could  ex- 
pand  or  contract  independently  of  the  narrowly- 
defined  money  supply.  In  the  Radcliffe  view,  at- 
tempts  to  reduce  inflation  via  contraction  of  the 
money  supply  could  be  frustrated  by  a  compensatory 
increase  in  money  substitutes,  which  in  the  equation 
of  exchange  would  appear  as  a  rise  in  the  velocity 
of  money.  To  summarize,  the  Radcliffe  view  re- 
stated,  albeit  in  modern  terms,  the  old  Banking 
School  arguments  (1)  that  it  is  hard  to  draw  the 
line  between  money  and  near-money,  (2)  that  the 
volume  of  credit  that  can  be  erected  on  a  given 
monetary  base  is  virtually  unlimited,  and  (3)  that 
the  supply  of  credit  is  an  endogenous  variable  re- 
sponding  to  the  demand  for  it. 
The  Monetarist  Counterattack  Quantity  theo- 
ists  responded  to  the  Keynesian  attack  with  counter- 
arguments  based  on  theoretical  developments  and 
empirical  research.  Chief  among  the  theoretical  de- 
velopments  contributing  to  the  resurgence  of  the 
quantity  theory  were  (1)  the  theory  of  the  real 
balance  or  wealth  effect,  and  (2)  Milton  Friedman’s 
reformulation  of  the  quantity  theory  as  a  theory  of 
the  demand  for  money. 
The  theory  of  the  real  balance  effect  was  used  to 
demonstrate  that  money  matters,  at  least  in principle, 
even  in the  extreme  Keynesian  case where  the  interest 
rate  channel  is blocked  by  a  liquidity  trap  and/or  an 
interest-insensitive  investment  spending  schedule. 
The  key  assumptions  of  the  analysis  were  that  real 
balances  are  a  component  of  wealth  and  that  wealth 
is  an  important  determinant  of  consumption  and  in- 
vestment  spending.  According  to  the  real  balance 
argument,  prices  would  fall  in  a  depression,  thereby 
raising  the  purchasing  power  of wealth  held  in money 
form,  The  price-induced  rise  in  the  real  value  of 
cash  balances  would  then  stimulate  spending  directly 
until  full  capacity  utilization  had  been  attained.  As 
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in  interest  rates,  closure  of  the  indirect  channel  could 
not  prevent  the  restoration  of  full  employment.  It 
was  but  a  short  step  from  the  analysis  of  the  price- 
induced  wealth  effect  to  the  argument  that  a  rise  in 
real  balances  and  hence  spending  could  be  accomp- 
lished  just  as  easily  via  a  monetary  expansion,  there- 
by  proving  the  potential  potency  of  monetary  policy 
even  in  a  depression. 
In  sum,  the  real  balance  argument  weakened  the 
Keynesian  attack  in  several  important  respects.  At 
the  theoretical  level,  it  offered  both  an  avenue  of 
escape  from  the  Keynesian  liquidity  trap  and  a means 
of  thwarting  the  interest  inelasticity  of  the  invest- 
ment  spending  schedule,  thus  contradicting  the 
Keynesian  doctrine  of  underemployment  equilibrium. 
Moreover,  it  cast  doubt  on  the  Keynesian  view  of 
money  as  a  specific  substitute  solely  for  bonds.  It 
created  this  doubt  by  emphasizing  the  relation  be- 
tween  real  balances  and  spending,  thus  suggesting 
that  money  was  a general  substitute  for  a  wide  range 
of  goods  and  services.  Finally,  it  suggested  that  the 
Keynesian  view  of the  monetary  transmission  mecha- 
nism  was  seriously  incomplete. 
The  second  important  theoretical  development  was 
Milton  Friedman’s  restatement  of  the  quantity 
theory,  a  reformulation  that  emphasized  two  novel 
features.  First,  the  quantity  theory  was  reinterpreted 
as  a  theory  of  the  demand  for  money  rather  than 
as  a theory  of  the  determination  of the  level  of  prices 
and  nominal  income.  Second,  the  essence  of  the 
quantity  theory  was  said  to  be  the  existence  of  a 
stable  functional  relationship  between  the  velocity  of 
money  (or  its  counterpart,  the  quantity  of  real 
balances  demanded)  and  a  small  number  of  inde- 
pendent  variables  that  determine  it. 
The  reader  will  notice  how  Friedman’s  reformula- 
tion  was  designed  to  rebut  many  of  the  Keynesian. 
criticisms.  In  denying  that  the  quantity  theory  was 
a  theory  of  income  determination,  Friedman  freed  it 
from  the  Keynesian  criticism  that  it  assumed  full  em- 
ployment.  And  in  stating  the  quantity  theory  as  a 
demand-for-money  function  capable  of  being  em- 
pirically  tested,  Friedman  countered  the  Keynesian 
contention  that  the  theory  was  a  mere  tautology. 
Finally,  Friedman’s  treatment  of  velocity  as  a  stable 
functional  relationship  refuted  the  Keynesian  argu- 
ments  (1)  that  velocity  is a  mere  arithmetic  calcula- 
tion  devoid  of  economic  content  ;  (2)  that  the 
quantity  theory  assumes  velocity  to  be  constant;  and 
(3)  that  velocity  is  an  unstable  magnitude  subject 
to  erratic,  unpredictable  shifts.  In  Friedman’s  for- 
mulation,  fluctuations  in  velocity  are  perfectly  con- 
sistent  with  the  idea  of  a  stable  functional  relation, 
since  those  shifts  may  be  caused  by  changes  in  the 
independent  variables  of  the  velocity  function. 
Quantity  theorists  also  attempted  to  refute  Key- 
nesian  criticisms  with  empirical  research.  Two  types 
of  empirical  studies  were  utilized.  The  first  was  a 
reexamination  of  American  financial  history,  the 
main  contributions  being  Friedman  and  Schwartz’s 
A  Monetary  History  of the  United  States,  1867-1960 
and  Cagan’s  Determinants  and  Effects  of  Changes  in 
the  Stock  of  Money,  1867-1960.  Both  volumes 
amply  demonstrated  the  significant  independent  role 
played  by  money  stock  changes  in  U.  S.  business 
cycles.  One  of  the  main  conclusions  of  the  Fried- 
man  and  Schwartz  study  was  that  a  rapid  and  large 
reduction  in  the  money  supply  played  the  dominant 
causal  role  in  the  Great  Contraction  of  the  1930’s. 
This  finding  led  to  the  criticism  that  the  Keynesian 
interpretation,  which  had  attributed  the  depression 
to  a collapse  of investment  demand,  was  a misreading 
of the  facts  of experience.  The  Cagan  volume  demon- 
strated,  as  did  the  Friedman  and  Schwartz  study, 
that  throughout  much  of  U.  S.  monetary  history  the 
supply  of money  was  independently  determined.  This 
evidence  seemed  to  refute  the  Banking  School-Rad- 
cliffe  doctrine  that  the  stock  of  money  is  demand- 
determined. 
The  second  type  of  empirical  research  advanced 
in  defense  of  the  quantity  theory  took  the  form  of 
statistical  tests,  conducted  in  the  early  1960’s,  com- 
paring  the  predictive  accuracy  of  Friedman’s  version 
of  the  quantity  theory  against  the  rival  Keynesian 
income-expenditure  theory.  In  these  tests,  the 
quantity  theory  consistently  out-performed  the  Key- 
nesian  theory.  Recent  studies,  however,  have  cast 
doubt  on the  validity  of the  basic  methodology  under- 
lying  these  tests.  Hence,  the  findings  should  be  re- 
garded  as  inconclusive.  At  the  time,  however,  the 
tests  seemed  to  support  the  quantity  theory. 
Associated  with  the  resurgence  of  the  quantity 
theory  has  been  a  rise  in  the  monetarist  approach  to 
policy  problems.  The  monetarist  view  contains 
several  elements.  It  regards  monetary  policy  as 
having  a  powerful  long-run  impact  on  nominal  in- 
come.  By  contrast,  it  regards  fiscal  policy  as  having 
a  negligible  and  incomes  policy  a  perverse  long-run 
impact  on  economic  activity.  Monetarists,  further- 
more,  argue  that  the  quantity  of  money,  rather  than 
the  level  and  structure  of  interest  rates,  is  the  ap- 
propriate  variable  for  the  monetary  authority  to 
regulate.  And  finally,  monetarists  hold  that  the  ex- 
istence  of  long  and  variable  lags  makes  it  difficult  to 
predict  the  short-run  impact  of  monetary  changes; 
therefore,  discretionary  stabilization  policy  should 
be  abandoned  in  favor  of  a  rigid  rule  whereby  the 
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responding  to  the  long-term  growth  rate  of  real  out- 
put.  These  monetarist  policy  prescriptions  have 
gained  increasing  recognition  in  recent  years. 
SURVIVAL  OF  THE  CLASSICAL  QUANTITY  THEORY 
IN  THE MODERN  MONETARIST  APPROACH 
This  article  has  sketched  the  evolution  of  the 
quantity  theory  of  money  from  its  fragmentary  pre- 
classical  beginnings,  through  its  crystallization  and 
consolidation  in  classical  monetary  analysis,  and 
finally  to  its  culmination  in  the  recent  rise  of  mone- 
tarism.  Among  the  milestones  in this  long  process  of 
historical  development  were  :  (1)  Bodin’s  hypothesis 
concerning  the  cause  of  the  16th  century  price  revo- 
lution  ;  (2)  the  Cantillon-Hume  two-fold  distinction 
between  (i)  equilibrium  statics  and  disequilibrium 
dynamics,  and  (ii)  the  long-run  neutrality  and  short- 
run  non-neutrality  of  money,  both  distinctions  neces- 
sary  to  an  understanding  of the  causal  role  of money  ; 
(3)  the  classical  economists’  application  of  the 
theory  to  policy  questions  concerning  the  regulation 
of  the  money  supply  ;  (4)  the  mathematical  restate- 
ment  of  the  theory  by  Irving  Fisher  and  other  neo- 
classical  economists  ; and,  finally,  (5)  Milton  Fried- 
man’s  recent  reformulation  of  the  quantity  theory 
as  a  theory  of  the  demand  for  money. 
To  some  extent,  however,  this  evolution  has  been 
illusory.  Despite  the  apparent  growing  sophistica- 
tion  and  complexity  of  the  theory,  there  has  been  no 
radical  change  in  its  basic  tenets  since  the  early 
19th  century.  After  having  gained  firm  roots  in 
classical  monetary  tradition,  the  fundamental  postu- 
lates  of  the  theory  experienced  little  subsequent  al- 
teration.  Since  the  classical  period,  most  of  the  im- 
provements  in  the  theory  have  consisted  of  its 
periodic  and  increasingly  rigorous  reformulation  in 
order  to  conform  with  the  latest  innovations  in  eco- 
nomic  theorizing  or  to  meet  the  increasingly  severe 
standards  of  empirical  testing.  Examples  include 
(1)  Fisher’s  reformulation  of  the  theory  in  terms 
of  the  equation  of  exchange,  which  corresponded  to 
the  emerging  use  of mathematics  in neo-classical  eco- 
nomic  analysis,  and  (2)  Friedman’s  restatement, 
which  utilized  the  latest  developments,  in  capital 
theory  and  incorporated  the  asset  or  portfolio  ap- 
proach  to the  demand  for  money,  and  which  facilitated 
statistical  estimation  and  testing.2  These  refinements 
changed  the  outward  appearance  of  the  theory  with- 
out  altering  its  underlying  postulates. 
2 It should be noted that  the  balance-sheet or  asset-portfolio  approach 
is  not  of  monetarist  origin.  This  approach  was  first  developed by 
Keynes  and  J.  R.  Hicks  in  the  mid-1930’s  and  was  elaborated  sub- 
sequently  by  James  Tobin  and  others. 
The  survival  of  these  19th  century  monetary 
postulates  serves  to  link  the  older  with  more  modern 
explanations  of  the  quantity  theory.  It  is,  therefore, 
fitting  to  close  the  article  with  a  brief  comparison 
of  the  chief  conclusions  of  the  classical  and  the 
monetarist  versions  of  the  theory.  The  classical  ex- 
planation,  it  will  be  remembered,  stressed:  (1)  the 
neutrality  of money  in  long-run  equilibrium,  (2)  the 
temporary  non-neutrality  of  money  in  the  transition 
period,  (3)  the  causal  role  of money  in  the  transmis- 
sion  mechanism,  (4)  the  monetary  theory  of  price 
movements,  (5)  long-run  proportionality  between 
money  and  prices,  and  (6)  exogeneity  of  the  money 
supply.  Moreover,  the  classical  policy  analysis 
yielded  the  additional  conclusions  that  the  money 
supply  can  be  effectively  regulated  through  the  con- 
trol  of  its  note  component  alone  and  that  time  lags 
render  discretionary  monetary  stabilization  efforts 
destabilizing,  thus  necessitating  the  imposition  of  a 
fixed  rule. 
In  line  with  the  classical  notion  of  the  long-run 
neutrality  of  money,  monetarists  still  argue  that  the 
long-term  expansion  path  of  output  is determined  by 
real  factors,  e.g.,  resource  endowments,  technology, 
and  the productivity  of labor  and  capital.  It  is argued 
that  changes  in  the  money  stock  can  have  no  long- 
run  impact  on  these  real  determinants  of  output. 
Consequently,  in  long-run  equilibrium  money  is 
merely  a  veil.  Monetarists,  furthermore,  adhere  to 
the  classical  doctrine  that  the  real  rate  of  interest  is 
determined  by  the  non-monetary  forces  of  produc- 
tivity  and  thrift.  They  reject  the  neo-Keynesian 
view  that  the  monetary  authorities  can  permanently 
alter  the  real  rate  of  interest  (and  thus  the  pace  of 
capital  formation  and  the  growth  rate  of  output)  via 
changes  in  the  money  supply.  Likewise  they  reject 
the  neo-Keynesian  notion  that  an  expansionary 
monetary  policy  can  permanently  peg  the  rate  of  un- 
employment  at  low  levels.  There  can  be no  long-run 
relation,  say  the  monetarists,  between  a  monetary 
variable  and  real  variables,  such  as  the  interest  rate 
and  the  rate  of  unemployment. 
Monetarists  adhere  to  the  classical  doctrine  of  the 
temporary  short-run  non-neutrality  of  money.  They 
stress  that  any  sudden  change  in  the  money  supply 
or  its  rate  of  growth  will  have  a  significant  frictional 
impact  on  output,  employment,  and  perhaps  the 
product-mix.  AS  the  chief  reason  for  these  non- 
neutral  transition  effects,  they  cite  the  distortion  of 
relative  prices  owing  to  the  failure  of  some  prices 
to  adjust  as  fast  as  others  to  the  monetary  change. 
They  point  out  that  prices  do  not  adjust  fully  and 
instantaneously  to  an  unanticipated  monetary  change 
because  it takes  time  for  people  to perceive  the  change 
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and  price  level  changes  are  fully  recognized  and 
future  changes  in  these  variables  are  correctly  an- 
ticipated.  Consequently,  actual  price  changes  in  all 
sectors  of  the  economy  adjust  completely  to  price 
experience  and  price  expectations,  thus  eliminating 
the  temporary  distortions  to  real  variables.  The 
same points,  of course,  have  been  accepted  by  quantity 
theorists  since  Cantillon  and  Hume. 
ices  and  new  assets.  These  asset  price  and  yield 
changes,  in  turn,  generate  changes  in  the  demands 
for  service  flows  and  new  asset  stocks  and  hence  in 
the  prices  and/or  outputs  of  the  latter  items. 
As  for  the  active  role  of money  in the  transmission 
mechanism,  monetarists  stress  that  money  stock 
changes  precede  and  cause  changes  in  nominal  na- 
tional  income.  Similar  to  their  Bullionist  and  Cur- 
rency  School  forebears,  monetarists  view  money  as 
the  chief  source  of  economic  disturbance  and  as  the 
predominant  cause  of  price  level  changes.  They  at- 
tribute  both  the  Great  Depression  of  the  1930’s  and 
the  post-1965  inflation  to  the  erratic  behavior  of  the 
money  supply.  Inflation,  they  state,  is  always  and 
everywhere  a  monetary  phenomenon.  Since  money 
is the  main  disrupter  of  economic  equilibrium,  it  fol- 
lows  that  proper  control  of  the  money  supply  is  the 
key  to  reducing  inflation  and  depression. 
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The  active  role  of  money  is also  stressed  in  mone- 
tarists’  theoretical  analysis  of  the  monetary  adjust- 
ment  process.  Here  the  motivating  force  is  always 
seen  to  be  discrepancy  between  actual  and  desired 
real  cash  balances,  i.e.,  an  excess  supply  of  money. 
If  people  have  more  money  than  they  desire,  they 
will  spend  the  excess  for  assets,  including  securities, 
investment  goods,  and  consumption  goods.  The  in- 
creased  spending  eventually  leads  to  higher  prices, 
thereby  bringing  actual  real  balances  back  to  their  de- 
sired  level  and  thus  eliminating  the  initial  excess  sup- 
ply  of  money.  The  emphasis  in  the  monetarists 
analysis  is clearly  on  the  causal  role  played  by  money 
in  the  adjustment  to  new  equilibrium. 
Although  the  monetarist  analysis  differs  from  the 
classical  in  the  role  it  assigns  to  the  portfolio-ad- 
justment  process,  it  nevertheless  agrees  with  the 
classical  view  of  the  strength  of  the  transmission 
mechanism.  Modern  monetarists  maintain  that  the: 
linkages  connecting  money  to  spending  are  numerous, 
thereby  permitting  the  full  impact  of  a  monetary 
change  to  be  transmitted  to  prices  and  nominal  in- 
come.  Monetarists  argue  that  the  portfolio-adjust- 
ment  or  asset-substitution  effects  of  a  monetary 
change  have  a  powerful  influence  on  spending  be- 
cause  they  operate  over  such  a  wide  range  of  assets 
and  interest  rates.  It  should  be  noted  in  passing 
that  the  question  of  the  appropriate  range  of  assets 
and  interest  rates  to  be  considered  in  the  analysis  of 
the  transmission  mechanism  is  a  key  point  in  the 
monetarist-Keynesian  controversy  over  the  spending 
impact  of  monetary  changes.  Unlike  the  monetarist 
model,  Keynesian  models  tend  to  concentrate  on  a 
narrow  range  of  assets  and  interest  rates.  Conse- 
quently,  the  transmission  process  is  forced  to  go 
through  an  extremely  narrow  channel,  thereby  chok- 
ing  off  some  of  the  spending  impact  of  a  monetary 
change.  No  such  limitation  exists  in  the  monetarist 
model,  which  concentrates  on  a  wide  range  of  assets 
and  interest  rates.  In  the  monetarist  analysis,  in- 
dividuals  are  seen  as  disposing  of  their  excess  money 
balances  over  a broad  spectrum  of  existing  assets,  in- 
cluding  bonds,  equities,  durable  producer  goods, 
durable  and  semi-durable  consumer  goods. 
On  the  related  issue  of the  transmission  mechanism, 
the  monetarist  analysis  tends  to  emphasize  interest 
rate  effects  more  than  did  the  classical  analysis,  which 
tended  to  highlight  the  direct  impact  of  monetary 
changes  on  commodity  expenditure.  Despite  a  great 
deal  of  lip-service  paid  to  the  notion  of  the  direct 
effect,  monetarists  now  acknowledge  that  the  trans- 
mission  mechanism  operates  primarily  through  a 
complicated  portfolio  or  balance  sheet  adjustment 
process  involving  numerous  interest  rate  channels 
and  affecting  a wide  range  of assets  and  expenditures. 
Specifically,  the  monetarist  views  monetary  changes 
as generating  shifts  in  the  composition  of  asset  port- 
folios  or  balance  sheets,  thereby  inducing  changes 
in the  prices  and  yields  of existing  financial  and  non- 
financial  assets  (including  producer  and  consumer 
durable  goods)  relative  to  the  prices  of  current  serv- 
Modern  monetarists  also  agree  with  classical 
quantity  theorists  on  the  question  of  the  exogeneity 
of the  money  supply.  Like  the  Bullionists  and  mem- 
bers  of  the  Currency  School,  monetarists  contend 
that  the  central  bank  can  exercise  effective  control 
over  the  nominal  money  stock  by  controlling  a  nar- 
rowly  defined  base  of high-powered  money  (currency 
plus  bank  reserves).  More  specifically,  monetarists 
maintain  that  the  supply  of  money  is  determined  by 
three  distinct  variables,  including  (1)  the  monetary 
base  (controlled  by  the  monetary  authority),  (2) 
the  reserve/deposit  ratio  (determined  by  the  de- 
cisions  of  commercial  bankers  subject  to  legal  re- 
serve  requirements),  and  (3)  the  currency/deposit 
ratio  desired  by  non-bank  individuals.  The  latter 
two  determinants  form  the  sole  components  of  the 
so-called  money  multiplier  which,  when  multiplied 
by  the  monetary  base,  yields  the  money  supply. 
Monetarists  contend  that  the  money  multiplier  forms 
a  fairly  stable  link  between  the  base  and  the  money stock,  thus  permitting  the  central  bank  to exercise  ef- 
fective  control  over  the  money  supply.  It  is true  that 
the  money  multiplier  itself  is  not  under  the  direct 
control  of  the  central  bank.  Commercial  bankers  and 
the  public,  via  their  decisions  regarding  the  desired 
reserve/deposit  and  currency/deposit  ratios,  de- 
termine  the  size  of  the  multiplier.  But  monetarists 
argue  that  the  money  multiplier  and  its  component 
ratios  are  sufficiently  stable  and  predictable  to  per- 
mit  firm  control  of  the  money  stock  via  control  of 
the  monetary  base. 
On  other  policy  issues  relating  to  money  control. 
monetarists  echo  the  views  of  their  19th  century 
predecessors.  Today’s  monetarists  are  no  less critical 
of  the  central  bank  than  were  Ricardo  and  other 
Bullionist  writers  of  the  19th  century  Bank  of  Eng- 
land.  Similar  to  Ricardo,  who  pointed  out  that  by 
pegging  the  interest  rate,  the  central  bank  may  lose 
control  of  the  money  supply,  modern  monetarists  in- 
sist  that  interest  rates  are  a misleading  guide  to  mone- 
tary  policy.  Like  the  Currency  School,  which  argued 
that  convertibility  was  an  insufficient  safeguard  to 
overissue  because  of  time-lags  that  might  bring 
the  central  bank’s  gold  reserve  near  to  exhaustion, 
modern  monetarists  argue  that  the  existence  of  long 
and  variable  lags  in  the  relation  between  money,  in- 
come,  and  prices,  as well  as the  lack  of understanding 
of those  lags,  militates  against  the  use of discretionary 
monetary  policy.  The  effect  of  these  lags,  mone- 
tarists  hold,  is  to  make  the  short-run  response  of 
income  to  monetary  changes  erratic  and  hard  to  pre- 
dict.  It  follows,  therefore,  that  short-run  stabilization 
policy  is  at  best  difficult  and  at  worst  likely  to  be 
perverse  and  hence  should  be  avoided.  Following 
the  example  of  the  Currency  School,  monetarists 
advocate  that  the  central  bank’s  discretionary  man- 
agement  be  replaced  by  a  rule-in  this  case  a  rule 
fixing  the  annual  percentage  growth  rate  of  the 
money  stock  at a steady  figure  roughly  corresponding 
to  the  long-term  growth  rate  of  output. 
Monetarist  doctrine  departs  from  the  strict  classical 
quantity  theory  on  at  least  one  major  point,  i.e.,  the 
proportionality  postulate.3  Monetarists  do  not  insist 
3 There  are  other  differences  of  course.  For  example,  modern  mone- 
tarists  employ  a  more comprehensive measure of  the  money supply- 
defined  to  include demand deposits  as  well  as  notes  and  coin-than 
did  their  classical  predecessors.  Moreover.  modern  monetarists  also 
favor  flexible  foreign  exchange  rates  whereas  the  Currency  School 
advocated fixed  rates. 
on  a  rigidly  proportional  relationship  between  mone- 
tary  changes  and  price  level  changes.  As  previously 
mentioned,  the  proportionality  postulate  follows  from 
the  classical  assumption  of  constancy  in  the  quantity 
of  real  cash  balances  demanded  by  moneyholders. 
If  real  cash  balances  are  to  remain  unchanged  fol- 
lowing  a  change  in  the  nominal  money  stock,  then  a 
rise  in  M  must  necessarily  be  accompanied  by  an 
equiproportional  rise  in  P  to  keep  real  balances, 
M/P,  the  same.  Unlike  classical  quantity  theorists, 
however,  monetarists  do  not  interpret  the  quantity 
of  real  balances  demanded  as  a  numerical  constant. 
Instead,  they  view  it  as  a  stable  function  of  several 
variables,  including  wealth,  real  income,  expected  real 
rates  of interest  (the  opportunity  cost  of money  hold- 
ings),  and  the  anticipated  rate  of  inflation  (the  de- 
preciation  cost  of  cash  balances).  Depending  on 
movements  in  these  variables,  the  quantity  of  real 
balances  demanded  may  alter  from  time  to  time.  For 
example,  if  a  monetary  injection  leads  to  a  rise  in 
the  anticipated  rate  of  inflation,  the  quantity  of  real 
balances  demanded  will  fall.  People  will  want  to 
hold  a  smaller  quantity  of  real  balances  than  before 
because  of  the  rise  in  the  depreciation  cost  of  money 
holdings.  In  consequence,  prices  will  rise  in  greater 
proportion  than  the  change  in  the  money  stock.  The 
greater-than-proportionate  rise  in  P  is  necessary  to 
achieve  the  desired  reduction  in  real  balances,  M/P. 
Nevertheless,  the  difference  between  monetarists 
and  classical  quantity  theorists  on  the  proportionality 
question  is  not  very  great.  Monetarists  insist  that, 
under  normal  conditions,  the  quantity  of real  balances 
demanded  is  a  definite  and  stable  magnitude.  Real 
balances  demanded  may  fall  slightly  when  the  money 
supply  increases,  or  rise  somewhat  when  the  money 
supply  falls,  or  perhaps  even  undergo  some  alteration 
in the  absence  of monetary  change.  But  these  changes 
are  not  expected  to  be  very  large.  In  short,  while 
desired  real  balances  are  no  longer  viewed  as  a  con- 
stant,  they  are  seen  normally  as being  subject  to  only 
very  moderate  changes.  Under  such  conditions  any 
monetary  change  will  be  accompanied  by  near-pro- 
portional  change  in  prices.  Practically  speaking, 
therefore,  monetarists  would  probably  accept  the  pro- 
position  of  near-proportionality  between  money  and 
prices  in  the  long  run. 
Thomas  M.  Humphrey 
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